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Chapter 1
Introduction
A marketplace, as an historically-evolved institution, allows customers and suppliers
to meet at a certain place and a certain time in order to announce buying or selling
intentions which eventually match and may be settled. However, in recent years,
the developments in computer technology, electronic information processing, and the
Internet have pushed the transformation of traditional trading mechanisms into the
electronic world, and thereby transformed traditional markets into electronic markets.
1.1 Electronic Marketplace
The electronic market enables interactions between suppliers and consumers directly
via the Internet medium. The feature of electronic trading includes instantaneous
global search, geographical independence, decreased transaction costs, rapid spread
of information, control over participant identities and anonymity, and so on. Online
trading usually takes place in an electronic marketplace. It is provided by a market-
place operator, who provides the necessary hardware and software environment for the
electronic trading platform.
Among the many trading mechanisms applied in electronic marketplace, auction
is undoubtedly one of the prevailing protocols for efficient allocation of goods and
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determination of prices. Electronic auctions (e-auction) offer electronic implementa-
tions of the traditional bidding mechanisms, and are often integrated with contracting,
payments, and delivery of the goods being traded in electronic markets.
The advantages of using e-auction are manifold. Sellers can use e-auctions to reduce
surplus stock, to lower sales overhead, and to have a better utilization of production
capacity. Because of the lower cost it becomes feasible for sellers to offer for sale small
quantities of low value goods, such as used items. Buyers can use e-auctions to reduce
the search cost and the purchasing overhead cost. Besides, e-auctions can increase
efficiency and time-savings for both sellers and buyers.
As a result, many e-auction marketplaces were built in the last few years for sellers
and buyers to trade via auctions on the Internet. The Internet auction company eBay1
may serve as an example of hundreds of such marketplaces. Those marketplaces provide
similar auction services, such as search engine, item listing and description, electronic
transaction, etc., which they charge for. Clearly, the profits from those services depend
not only on the prices of the services, but also on the number of traders who use them.
Therefore, marketplace operators who provide similar auction services must compete
with each other in attracting potential participants (i.e., buyers and sellers) to trade.
1.2 Motivation
In this section, a short case study is conducted regarding the ongoing competition in
the Chinese e-auction market. Two marketplaces, eBay (China)2 and Taobao3, are the
main players in the market. eBay was a de facto monopolist, with over 80% share of
the Chinese e-auction market in 2002. However, its leading position has been greatly
challenged by Taobao. Taobao is a relative new marketplace which started business
operation in May 2003, but it successfully achieved 57.10% of the market share in a
1http://www.ebay.com
2http://www.ebay.com.cn
3http://www.taobao.com
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short two years by September 2005, while eBay’s market share was reduced to 34.19%.4
Taobao’s market share kept increasing in 2006, and forced eBay to stop its marketplace
service in China mainland as an independent provider in December 2006.5
Although the market share does not directly equal the market leadership of a firm in
a competitive market, it does reflect the competitive position of the firm. The success
of Taobao, as pointed out by many commentators, is that it is able to quickly attract
many users to participate and trade in Taobao. Besides, the listing fee policy of Taobao
seems to play an important role in attracting participants from its rival eBay.
The listing fee (also referred to as an “insertation fee” in eBay6), is the price that
a marketplace charges for listing an item or items for sale. This fee is charged only
to sellers at the time of listing. It is charged independently from auction transactions,
meaning that it is not refundable no matter whether the offered items are sold or not.
eBay used to charge listing fees to sellers for years, while Taobao announced from its
start that it would charge no listing fees at all. Commentators point out that the
zero listing fee policy let Taobao successfully attract many sellers from eBay, and the
increased number of sellers on Taobao helps it to attract buyers to join Taobao, too.
The significant gain in participants hence leads to a significant increase of the market
share for Taobao.
1.3 Research Questions
The analysis of the competition between eBay and Taobao through the commentaries
is interesting, but is lacking scientific support. Moreover, it is also not clear about
the future evolution of the market structure in the Chinese e-auction market. Will
the market structure evolve into a monopoly state, in which only one marketplace
4See http://news.analysys.com.cn/tjnews.php?id=1981.
5Rather, eBay decided to merge its service with another Internet service provider Tom.com. See
http://www2.ebay.com/aw/cn/200612.shtml#2006-12-2 for details.
6See http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/insertion-fee.html.
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survives as the winner? Or, will it evolve into a state of market duopoly, in which
both marketplaces coexist and the participants always “loyally” trade in their current
marketplaces?
Rather than carry the case study of eBay and Taobao into a deeper level, this
work generalized the problem, and studies the competition between two similar e-
auction marketplaces, which compete with each other to attract as many participants
as possible. The research questions are formally described below.
Q1. If all the institutions in the two marketplaces are the same, how does the market
evolve in respect to the dynamics of the winning prices of the auctions and the
selections of the participants?
Q2. Does a convergence of such evolution exist? If yes, does the evolution converge to
market duopoly or monopoly?
Q3. Does the market evolve differently if the institutional control of the listing fee
exists? What is the influence of the listing fee on the selections of the participants?
Q4. How can this study contribute to marketplace operators’ strategic operations in a
competitive e-auction market environment?
1.4 A Simple Scenario
This section describes a simple scenario of competing marketplaces and explores the
selection problem of the traders, in order to obtain a first impression of the competition.
Suppose in the electronic auction market there are two marketplaces (named as M1
and M2), that provide similar e-auction services. Both marketplaces have the same
objective to attract as many participants as possible.
Each participant is assumed to pursue payoff maximization via auctions and can
freely but exclusively choose one marketplace for this purpose. Intuitively, a seller
prefers the winning price of an auction to be as high as possible, in order to maximize
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his payoff.7 Contrarily, a buyer always looks for a marketplace, in which the winning
price is as low as possible.
Suppose that at one time, one seller, s1, and four buyers, b1, b2, b3 and b4, participate
in M1. The buyers’ bids for the single item provided by s1 are vb1 = 12.0, vb2 = 9.0,
vb3 = 5.0 and vb4 = 3.0, respectively. Meanwhile, M2 contains also some sellers and
buyers, but the number of sellers and buyers in M2 is unknown to participants in M1.
Suppose that the winning price of the auction in M1 (denoted by p(M1)) is the highest
rejected bid from the buyers. Thus, p(M1) equals 9.0. Suppose also that the price in
M2 (denoted by p(M2)) is 7.0.
Obviously, the buyer b1 wins the auction in M1, and his payoff pib1 = vb1 − p(M1) =
12.0− 9.0 = 3.0. However, by observing the price in M2, the buyer b1 may think: if I
had participated in M2, then my payoff would be higher. Therefore, b1 would prefer to
move to M2 for a possibly higher payoff, although he has won the auction in M1.
For the buyer b2, given a bid of 8.0, he fails to win the auction in M1. But if he
has participated in M2, he might have won the auction and received a positive payoff.
Therefore, b2 also prefers to move to M2. For the buyers b3 and b4, their valuations are
lower than both the auction prices. Therefore, they are not motivated to leave their
current marketplace M1, since they cannot win the auction in M2, either.
On the seller side, sellers would contrarily prefer M1 than M2, because the price is
higher in M1. Now assume that one seller, s2, moves from M2 to M1. M1 contains now
more sellers but the same number of buyers. If each buyer repeats his old bid in M1,
it is expected that p(M1) decreases. Assume, on the other hand, that no seller moves
to M1 but the buyer b1 leaves M1 and joins M2. Because there are fewer buyers in M1,
it can also be said that M1 contains relatively more sellers. If all the other buyers in
M1 insist on their former bids, p(M1) then decreases to 5.0, which is consistent with
the former expectation that p(M1) should decrease.
The above analysis shows that the winning prices in e-auction marketplaces are
7In the rest of this book, the winning price of an auction is shorted to the winning price, or simply
the price.
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dynamic, and they are influenced by the movements of sellers and buyers. However, an
increase or decrease of the price is not determined by the movement of a single buyer or
seller, but is rather an aggregate result of all buyers’ and sellers’ decisions. Therefore,
it is necessary to study the movements of participants on a macro level.
Now suppose that altogether there are n participants trading in two marketplaces,
M1 and M2, in which s participants are sellers and the rest b participants are buyers.
Denote the number of sellers and the number of buyers in a marketplace Mi by s(Mi)
and b(Mi) respectively, i = 1, 2. This scenario can be simply presented by Equation 1.1.
n = s+ b
=
2∑
i=1
s(Mi) +
2∑
i=1
b(Mi) (1.1)
s sellers s(M1) s(M2)
M1 M2
b buyers b(M1) b(M2)
Figure 1.1: Distribution of participants in two marketplaces.
At any given time, if one seller leaves M1 and joins M2, s(M1) then decreases by
one and s(M2) increases by one. Similarly, a buyer’s movement also leads to changes
in the number of buyers in both marketplaces. In other words, the movements of the
participants can be reflected in the change of the distribution of participants in the
marketplaces. Figure 1.1 gives a direct impression of that. Thus, the study of the
dynamics of the market can be conducted in an easy way, by studying the dynamics
of the distribution of participants.
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1.5 Organization of the Book
The presented work is organized in seven chapters, and the overall structure of it is
shown in Figure 1.2.
Introduction
Related Literature
Methodology
Simulation
Design of  Simulation 
 
Model
Simulation  
Experiment
Results and 
Analysis
Conclusion and Outlook
Figure 1.2: Organization of the book.
Chapter 2 provides a guide to related works around the topic of competition between
markets. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology problem and explains why computer-
based simulation is an appropriate method for the purpose of this study. This chapter
also briefly introduces the general framework of a simulation study.
In Chapter 4, a simulation model is proposed which formally describes the compe-
tition between two e-auction marketplaces. Series of simulation settings are designed
in Chapter 5 for experimentation. Chapter 6 analyzes in detail the data obtained from
the simulations. The findings are summarized and compared with results from related
literature. The final part of this book, Chapter 7, provides a concluding discussion
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of the limitations as well as the contributions of the presented study. In the end, an
outlook about further research is given.
Chapter 2
Related Literature
The general existence of competition in our daily lives makes it a vivid field of research
in economics. Economists are used to the notion of competition within a market.
Typically, research works address the competition only within one market, such as the
competition among sellers to attract buyers (see, for example, McAfee (1993), Peters
and Severinov (1997), and Burguet and Sakovics (1999)).
However, competition also exists between markets, for example, between market
operators or between the market rule-regulators. Some researchers study the competi-
tion under different market environment scenarios; some investigate several factors or
factor combinations; and some others use various performance measures in analysis.
Literature of this category is closely related to the presented work, and this chapter
mainly introduces the research works of this category.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the research works that
study the competition between conventional marketplaces, which generally include all
the marketplaces that do not operate on Internet. Section 2.2 deals with the studies
on competitions between conventional and electronic marketplaces, and that between
electronic marketplaces as well. Section 2.3 presents several papers which investigate
competitions empirically. Section 2.4 summarizes this chapter.
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2.1 Competition between Conventional Markets
This section introduces the papers that study the competition between conventional
marketplaces, which include direct exchange markets and intermediaries. In direct
exchange markets, buyers and sellers are matched by the market directly, or they seek
each other out by costly search, and then negotiate on prices.
Intermediaries often compete with decentralized direct exchanges in attracting po-
tential buyers and sellers. Market intermediaries provide a central place of exchange.
They buy items from sellers and sell the items to buyers. The intermediated exchange
can have advantages over direct exchange for many reasons. These include lowering
the costs of transacting through centralization of exchange, reducing costs of searching
and bargaining, etc. (Spulber, 1999, p. ix).
2.1.1 Between Search Market and Intermediary
Gehrig studies the competition between a search market and a monopolistic interme-
diary (Gehrig, 1993). In the search market, individual agents who are buyers or sellers
are randomly matched and the prices at which the exchanges take place are set bilat-
erally. Because matching is random, the search market does not exhaust all possible
gains from trade.
The intermediary sets a publicly observable bid price at which he is willing to buy
from the sellers, and a publicly observable ask price, at which he is willing to sell what
he has previously bought. The intermediary trades simultaneously with both buyers
and sellers. Agents face three options: to join the search market, to trade with the
intermediary, or simply remain inactive.
Gehrig shows that there is an equilibrium in which the search market and the market
of the monopolistic intermediary are simultaneously open, and the intermediary makes
positive profits because he trades at a positive ask-bid spread.
Loertscher studies a scenario similar to Gehrig’s work above, in which buyers and
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sellers choose to join one of the several intermediaries, to join a search market, or
remain inactive (Loertscher, 2004). Loertscher’s model extends the model of Gehrig
in three aspects. Firstly, in his model there is a finite number of market-making
intermediaries rather than only one. Secondly, a sequential structure is imposed, by
requiring that the intermediaries first have to buy the goods from the sellers (buy in the
input market) before they can be sold to buyers (sell in the output market). Thirdly, a
physical capacity constraint of the tradable items is introduced for the intermediaries
in competition.
Based on this model, Loertscher shows that the intermediaries endowed with Cournot
capacities (or with smaller than Cournot capacities) set the same market clearing price
on the input and output markets, and trade the same quantity on the subgame perfect
equilibrium path of the game as would be set and traded if input and output mar-
kets were organized by a Walrasian auctioneer.8 As a corollary, when the number of
intermediaries with Cournot capacities becomes large, the equilibrium in this model
coincides with the Walrasian perfect competition outcome.
2.1.2 Between Location Differentiated Markets
In the competition between conventional markets, the location of a marketplace is often
an important issue. This issue is studied by Gehrig (1998), in which a two-dimensional
spatial competition between two places of market is analyzed. One dimension is the
geographical distance, and the other dimension investigated is the product characteris-
tics (such as maturity of a futures contract). The scenario is modeled as a multi-stage
game. In the first stage, each firm (seller) selects a location of market to offer prod-
ucts to sell. Each firm offers precisely one kind of product in exactly one market, but
the markets may contain products of different varieties. In the second stage, fiscal
authorities (market makers) define the transaction taxes on the basis of the relative
8The Walrasian auctioneer is the presumed auctioneer that matches supply and demand in a market
of perfect competition.
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attractiveness of their markets. The structure of the markets, i.e. the number of vari-
eties and the vectors of prices on offer, are known by the customers (buyers). Based on
this information, the customers decide which market to enter in the last stage, without
knowing their own demands.
The competition in the aspects of the price and the transaction tax in a multi-stage
game is investigated. The paper reveals that if the market externalities are strong, a
firm with a lower price not only increases its market share at the expense of its closest
rivals, but also makes the marketplace in which he participates become more attractive
to outside consumers, which benefits all firms in this marketplace. The attractiveness
of a marketplace to customers is also increased when the number of the participating
firms in the marketplace increases, although this leads to increasing competitiveness
for the firms in the marketplace at the same time.
This paper also points out the innate conflict of domestic fiscal authorities in taxing
domestic firms. If authorities plan to participate in industry profits by means of a
transactions tax, they have to limit the ability of domestic firms to attract foreign
(and domestic) customers. The tax hence reduces the ability of domestic firms to
compete internationally.
The fiscal authorities can afford high tax rates when their domestic markets are very
attractive, as measured by the number of firms. Despite the fact that transaction taxes
reduce the agglomeration advantage, in equilibrium they do not completely annihilate
this advantage.
2.1.3 Between Financial Intermediaries
Market makers include not only price-making firms but also other market institutions
such as organized exchanges for securities, options, futures, and other financial assets.
Competition between markets typically exists in financial areas, such as between stock
exchanges or between credit card firms.
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Santos and Scheinkman (2001) study the competition among financial intermedi-
aries. The motivation of their work arises from an often-heard assertion that competi-
tions among financial intermediaries force them to sign contracts with customers with
lower standards (i.e., with fewer contractual guarantees), in order to increase trading
volume. An analytical model is constructed to describe the competition, taking into
consideration that traders differ in credit quality and may default (fail to fulfill the
obligation).
The authors find that the competition does not necessarily lead to low standards,
and the intermediaries demand rather appropriate amounts of guarantees, when the
credit quality is observable. Moreover, the private information about credit quality has
an ambiguous effect in a competitive environment. When the cost of default is large
(small), the private information leads to higher (lower) standards.
2.2 Competition between Electronic Markets
The presence of electronic markets provides an alternative for trading within a new
market environment. The markets that apply information technologies in traditional
businesses, for example the retail sector, inevitably compete with the existing market-
places. Besides, with the growth of e-commerce, the providers of Internet marketplaces
begin to compete with each other, too. This calls for a better understanding of the
electronic market as well as the competition.
This section closely investigates the studies which focus on the competitions between
electronic markets, such as the competitions between institution designers, between the
operators of electronic marketplaces, or between electronic intermediaries.
2.2.1 Between Online- and Conventional Channels
Technology-driven online commerce channels, such as the Web, possess several unique
features that differentiate them from conventional channels — channel flexibility, pos-
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itive network externalities, and market lock-in (switching costs). These channels have
become a significantly differentiated choice for consumers, and provide firms with new
opportunities to rethink the way business is conducted.
Viswanathan (2005) studies the competition between technology-differentiated chan-
nels. A stylized spatial-differentiation model is set up to examine how the three key pa-
rameters, that is, the channel flexibility, the positive network externalities, and market
lock-in (switching costs), affect competition between online, conventional, and hybrid
firms (namely firms that operate across multiple channels).
Network externalities, especially positive network externalities, are often noticed
in the study of two-sided markets: an increase in the size of one side of the market
(namely the number of firms) helps to attract the other side of the market (namely the
customers). The analysis in this paper indicates that while network externalities as
well as switching costs lead to the tipping of markets,9 such tipping occurs primarily
due to the moderating effects of the competing channels. Moreover, with network
externalities an increased market share does not translate into higher profits.
An interesting result from this paper is that in a static market, consumers rather
than firms benefit from increasing network externalities, with competitive effects out-
weighing the surplus-extraction abilities of firms. Viswanathan’s results highlight the
importance of alternative revenue streams and provide insights for firms grappling with
issues of channel choice as well as integration and divestiture.
2.2.2 Between e-Intermediaries
In the traditional economy, intermediaries often buy and resell goods. Now the develop-
ment of new technologies for information and communication has brought informational
intermediation to the forefront of the “new economy.” Intermediation in this new econ-
omy consists of services such as search, certification, advertising, and price discovery,
9Tipping is a set of activities that helps a firm “tip” a market toward its own platform rather than
some other one.
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as opposed to storage, showrooms, or delivery in the traditional intermediation.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) propose a model to analyze the imperfect competition
between two informational intermediation service providers. The model considers the
presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the non-exclusive
services of several intermediaries, and the widespread existence of price discrimination
based on the identities and usage of buyers and sellers. Matchmakers (intermediaries)
rely on two pricing strategies to attract buyers and sellers: the registration fee, which
is user-specific and paid ex ante; and the transaction fee, which is an ex post payment
after a transaction takes place between two matched parties.
Their study contributes to the literature in two aspects. First, it determines the
equilibrium market structure that is likely to emerge and characterizes the efficiency
property of the market in equilibrium.
Under the assumption that any generated matching surplus is efficiently shared,
they prove that, equilibria with the efficient market structure always exist. An effi-
cient market structure may involve only one intermediary serving all users or, with
non-exclusive technologies and low costs of matching, both intermediaries serving all
users, a situation they call “global multi-homing.” Intermediaries have incentives to
propose non-exclusive services so as to allow users to turn to several intermediaries
simultaneously, because this moderates competition and reinforces market power as
well as intermediation profits. But inefficient equilibria also exist, especially when the
matching technology is effective or the ability to rely on transaction fees is limited.
Second, it provides a precise description and analysis of the pricing strategies that
allow intermediation service providers to protect their businesses or to gain new busi-
ness. With exclusive services, matchmakers use transaction fees as an additional in-
strument to extract profit. In cases where multi-homing is efficient, transaction fees
are able to differentiate the intermediaries, with one offering low registration but high
transaction fees while the other adopts the mirror-pricing strategy.
Another study related to the price competition of e-intermediaries focuses on the
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B2B field (Suelzle, 2005). The competition is between two B2B intermediaries who
differ with each other regarding their ownership structures. One intermediary is an
independent marketplace operated by a third-party incumbent, while the other one is
a collaborative buy-side consortium intermediary, who challenges and competes with
the former in terms of attracting firms in buying and selling. The background of the
competing scenario is the decline of independent B2B marketplaces, which were highly
valued at the advent of B2B e-commerce some years ago during the formation of the
industry, and the formation of industry consortiums for establishing B2B electronic
marketplaces, which account for the recent developments in B2B e-commerce.
Suelzle’s study considers also indirect network externalities and the exclusivity of
registration. He finds that when firms can register exclusively with at most one in-
termediary, the independent intermediary is able to deter the entry of the challenger
only if the number of firms taking ownership in the consortium is sufficiently small.
Otherwise, the consortium can successfully enter and monopolize the market. When
firms can multi-home, i.e., they register simultaneously with both intermediaries, the
consortium can always enter while both intermediaries stay in the market with positive
profits.
One other work that also focuses on competition in the B2B field is from Yu and
Chaturvedi (2001). They build a two-stage game theoretic model, and investigate
the industrial structure in the dynamics of the competitions between B2B electronic
marketplaces. In the model, business traders who use different IT infrastructures (e.g.,
different information processing system) are modeled as being on different islands and
are not able to trade with each other directly. B2B marketplaces invest to build
networks that connect the islands and provide services to bring buyers and sellers
together. In the first stage, the marketplaces simultaneously and independently choose
the IT infrastructures they want to support, which thereby determines the liquidity
of the marketplaces. In the second stage, the marketplaces compete over the prices of
their services, whose qualities are differentiated in terms of liquidity.
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Their analytical results show that price competition between B2B exchanges does
not lead to a perfect competitive outcome, as in markets of vertically differentiated
products. Moreover, the industrial structure of B2B exchanges exhibits a natural
oligopoly. The number of active B2B exchanges in a market is bound, regardless of
how large the market is. If the user preferences are not highly diversified, only three
marketplaces can survive. Since, in many cases, electronic marketplaces provide their
services for free in order to gain liquidity in their marketplaces, it would then be risky
for the marketplaces to base their revenue models solely on transaction fees. The
authors suggest that the marketplaces find additional means, such as advertisements,
to generate revenue.
2.2.3 Between e-Auction Marketplaces
The IT technology helps to put the conventional auction market on the Internet. The
booming of electronic auction marketplaces naturally leads to the competitions between
them for attracting buyers and sellers.
Ellison et al. notice that the battles between several of the biggest e-auction mar-
ketplace operators often end with a single overwhelming winner. They wonder why
auction activity is concentrated, and build a game-theoretic model on competing auc-
tion markets for this purpose (Ellison et al., 2004). In the first stage, each buyer and
each seller simultaneously selects an auction site (marketplace) in order to trade. Each
seller offers a single unit of goods and sets a reservation price of zero. In the second
stage, buyers learn their private values for the goods, and a uniform-price auction is
held at each auction site.
They use the model to show that a larger auction marketplace typically provides a
greater expected surplus per participant (which they name as the scale effect, or the
efficiency effect); this scale effect pushes the market toward concentration. However,
since buyers and sellers have opposite preferences in respect to the winning price of an
auction, two competing auction marketplaces can still coexist in equilibrium despite
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the scale effect, and in equilibrium the marketplaces may be of quite different sizes
(i.e., may contain quite a different number of buyers and sellers).
However, there is a critical mass of buyers that a marketplace must attract to sur-
vive, and such mass of buyers increases proportionally with the total buyer population.
They also find that the range of the sizes of the marketplaces in equilibrium depends
on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the marketplaces are especially
thin (i.e., whether there are only a very small amount of buyers and sellers).
The competition between e-auction marketplaces is also studied via numerical ap-
proaches, for example in the research for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC).10
People in this research community are interested in studying the competition problem
via simulated agents. One of their activities is a game called TAC Market Design
Competition (shortened to reverse TAC, or simply CAT ), which especially addresses
the competition between market makers.
A CAT competition game consists of buyers, sellers, and brokers (i.e., marketplace
operators). The buyers and sellers are software agents, whose behavior is simulated
according to a common protocol. The brokers are also simulated agents, but their be-
havior is determined by several different human researcher groups (known as entrants)
that participate in the CAT game. Each broker operates a single exchange market
with a double auction. Each broker also sets the rules for his auction marketplace,
and for the buyers and sellers that participate in his marketplace as well. One of the
rules is the charging policy. The brokers are allowed to charge buyers and sellers a fee
for registering to trade. The brokers aim to attract potential buyers and sellers and
then to match the two parties, and they compete with one another in doing this. The
performance measure of the brokers is based on the profit, the market share, and the
rate of successful transactions.
Niu and his colleagues study the brokers and their behavior from the 2007 CAT
competition (Niu et al., 2008). They find that increasing fees will boost the profit
10See http://www.sics.se/tac/page.php?id=1.
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of a broker but gradually leads to loss of the market share. Moreover, if the market
share falls too low, the profit return cannot be sustained. In contrast, low charges
help a broker gain market share but hampers his profit. However, if a charging policy
is properly designed, it may keep both measures (namely the profit and the market
share) at suitably high levels.
The two papers introduced in this subsection both focus on the competition between
electronic auction marketplaces, which is also the problem field that the presented work
is interested in. Because of the close relevance, some of the results of these works are
revisited and compared with the results of the presented work in Section 6.4.
2.3 Empirical Studies
Many works analyze the competition between markets analytically. Besides, there are
also some works which investigate the competition between marketplaces empirically.
This section introduces two papers in this regard.
Kollmann (2000) conducts a case study of online German trading websites for used
cars. He aims to analyze the competitive situations of the operators of those market-
places, especially their strategies for increasing transactions. The operators compete
at two levels — the information level and the transaction level. There are two strat-
egy options at the information level — to generate a wide selection of search results
from the information matching (the selection strategy), or to create accurate search
results (the assignment strategy). The operators have also two strategy options at the
transaction level — to emphasize the quality of the intermediated transactions, or to
emphasize the number of intermediated transactions. Those strategy options of the
two levels form, as named by the author, a competition matrix, and it is used in the
paper as a method for comparing the marketplaces.
Kollmann finds that at the information level, although both selection strategies
and assignment strategies can be observed, most operators are still trying to become
assignment leaders. In regard to the transaction level, all marketplaces have much
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higher information matching rates than transaction rates, which indicates that all the
marketplaces have difficulties in moving from the information level to the transaction
level. However, the author points out that the cooperation of those online marketplaces
with real car dealers helps to achieve higher transaction rates, and can be seen as an
emphasis of quality at the transaction level.
Compared to Kollmann’s case study, the study by Lin and Li (2005) is more re-
lated to the presented work, because they conducted an empirical study of competing
electronic auction marketplaces. They analyze the competition between two main e-
auction marketplace operators in China – eBay and Taobao, with a focus on their
reputation systems.
Both marketplaces use positive, negative, and neutral scores as the indicators of
traders’ reputations. Lin and Li collect the reputation scores of sellers in both mar-
ketplaces, and use these as the basis of analysis. They find that the sellers on Taobao
receive reputation feedbacks less often than the sellers on eBay, therefore, they have on
average much lower overall reputation scores.11 However, the overall six-month posi-
tive feedback rates on Taobao and eBay are about the same. In respect to the neutral
and negative scores, the eBay sellers tend to have higher negative feedback rates, while
Taobao sellers are likely to have higher neutral feedback rates. This, as argued by the
authors, indicates the cultural differences in the traders’ populations. Taobao has all
its service built in China, and most of the traders are Chinese. By comparison, eBay
involves much more trading between Chinese and international traders, because eBay
is a well-known international marketplace service provider.
2.4 Summary
Although there is plenty of research about competition within a market, this chap-
ter confines itself to introducing only the research works focusing on the competition
11The overall reputation score of a seller is simply the sum of his positive, negative, and neutral
reputation scores.
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between markets.
The related literature is categorized in this chapter by whether the focus is on the
conventional markets or on the electronic markets. Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 intro-
duce the related works in these two categories separately. What is worth mentioning is
that part of the literature studies the competition between conventional and electronic
markets; this part of the literature is included in Section 2.2. The papers introduced
in this chapter differ in many aspects, e.g., the application field of the marketplaces
studied, the factors investigated, the measures of the analysis, and the methodology
used.
The next chapter deals with the methodological problems. The analytical methods
will be discussed as well as the numerical methods. It is also determined in the next
chapter which method is applied as the main research method of the presented study.

Chapter 3
Methodology
For the research questions proposed in Chapter 1, there is more than one method that
can be applied. This chapter discusses some possible approaches in the problem field,
and then one methodology is selected as the main approach for the presented work.
3.1 Analytical Solutions
Generally, in order to study a problem of an economic system, it is necessary to first
build a model that represents the problem, and then “solve” the model. There are
analytical and numerical ways to do this. An analytical study of an economic system
usually follows a four-stage procedure (Naylor, 1971, p. 7):
(1) the observation of the system;
(2) the formulation of a mathematical model that attempts to explain the observa-
tion of the system;
(3) the prediction of the behavior of the system on the basis of the model by using
mathematical or logical deduction, that is, by obtaining solutions to the model; and
(4) the performance of experiments to test the validity of the model.
Usually, analytical models are built upon preference-based individual decision the-
ories. Three characteristics are noteworthy. First, the core of such a model is equi-
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librium. The equilibrium provides a convenient tool for organizing the information
contained in the model. Second, the usefulness of the model generally lies in its ability
to yield comparative static results showing how this equilibrium changes as parameters
of the model change. Finally, behind this equilibrium analysis lie implicit assump-
tions about out-of-equilibrium behavior, designed to address the questions of how an
equilibrium is reached or why the equilibrium is interesting (Samuelson, 1998, p. 2).
There are several cases in which analytical analysis may not be the most feasible
method. First, it is frequently found in economics that to observe the actual behavior
of an economic system is either impossible or extremely costly. Such difficulty also lies
in this study, because tracing and recording the behavior of each individual participant
in the marketplaces across a long span of time is hard to achieve.
Secondly, for such real-world economic problems, complex and large dimensional
models are usually necessary. It is often hard or not attainable to find an analytical
solution. As a matter of fact, analytical solutions are often based on highly abstract
models of the real-world problems.
For example, perfect rationality is often assumed in an analytic model. The type of
rationality assumed in neoclassical economics — perfect, logical, deductive rationality
— is extremely useful in generating solutions to theoretical problems. But it demands
much of human behavior, much more in fact than it can usually deliver. There are
two reasons for perfect or deductive rationality to break down under complications.
The obvious one is that human logical capacity ceases to cope with problems beyond
a certain level of complexity — human rationality is bounded.
The other is that in interactive and complex situations, agents cannot rely upon
other agents they are dealing with to behave perfectly rational, and so they are forced
to guess their behavior. Therefore, it has been argued in recent decades that economic
models with bounded rational agents should be included (see Arthur (1994) and Arthur
(1991), for example).
The evolutionary game approach appears to be fruitful in the field of economics and
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business studies. There is a particular reason why economists should now be interested
in evolutionary models. Non-cooperative game theory, as applied in economics, is facing
two difficulties: first, in many economic problems, it is not entirely clear how Nash
Equilibrium can be finally reached by the players and, second, when there are many
equilibria with different implications, it is important to understand how a particular
equilibrium will eventually be selected. It happens that the dynamic adjustments
described by evolutionary models may give interesting answers to both questions. So,
even though economic applications are still rare and some progress is still to be made
in order to adapt the modeling, the path seems to be a very promising one to follow.
Learning models for game situations and evolutionary games have become an active
field of research since 1990. While the traditional approach treats a game in isolation,
with the modeler attempting only to infer the restrictions that players’ rationality im-
poses on the outcome, the evolutionary approach treats a game as a model designed to
explain some observed regularity when decision makers interact repeatedly in real time.
That is why this approach sometimes is also called the “steady-state” interpretation
of an equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).
Economic analysis has largely avoided questions about the way in which economic
agents make choices when confronted by a perpetually novel and evolving world. There
is a growing amount of economic literature using models of learning and adaptive
behavior and a number of searchers are using various evolutionary algorithms, ranging
from replication dynamics (see Van Damme (1991) and Binmore (1992), for example)
to genetic programming (see Arifovic (1994) and Kaebling et al. (1996), for example),
to specify the dynamics of the situation.
3.2 Numerical Solutions
Many economic systems can be classified as complex adaptive systems. Such a system
is complex in a special sense: (i) it consists of a network of interacting agents (pro-
cesses, elements); (ii) it exhibits a dynamic, aggregate behavior that emerges from the
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individual activities of the agents; and (iii) its aggregate behavior can be described
without a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the individual agents (Holland and
Miller, 1991). The resulting complex adaptive systems can be examined both numer-
ically and analytically, offering new ways of experimenting with and theorizing about
adaptive economic agents.
Typically, a numerical solution substitutes numbers for the independent variables
and parameters of a model and manipulates these numbers. Many numerical techniques
are iterative, i.e., each step in the solution gives a better solution using the results
from previous steps (examples are linear programming and Newton’s method from
approximating the roots of an equation). Two special numerical techniques are the
Monte Carlo method and simulation method.12
The Monte Carlo method, defined in a broad sense, is any technique for the solution
of a model using random numbers or pseudo random numbers. Simulation is defined
in a broad sense as “experimenting with a model over time” (Kleijnen, 1974, p. 12).
This definition emphasizes that simulation implies experimentation. However, instead
of experimenting with the real-world objects, the experiments are executed by means
of a model of virtual objects and the behavior of the modeled objects are followed over
time.
Kleijnen further defines simulation in a narrow sense as experimenting with an
(abstract) model over time, and this experimentation involves the sampling of values of
stochastic variables from their distributions. This type of simulation is called stochastic
simulation. Since random numbers are used, this type of simulation is also known as
Monte Carlo simulations.
There are many reasons why simulation is an advantageous method (see Adkins and
Pooch (1977) and Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999), for example). Some of the advantages
that are most important for the research problem in the presented work are listed in
the following.
12Notice that the various methods can be combined for the solution of a complicated model.
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• Simulation permits controlled experimentation. A simulation experiment can be
run a number of times with varying input variables to test the behaviors of the
system under a variety of situations and conditions. Thus, it is convenient for
sensitivity analysis by manipulation of input variables.
• Through simulation, one can study the effects of certain informational, organi-
zational, and environmental changes on the operation of a system by making
alterations in the model of the system and by observing the effects of these al-
terations on the system’s behavior. This may lead to a better understanding of
the system and to suggestions for improving it.
• Simulation can be used to experiment with new situations, about which we have
little or no information, so as to prepare for what may happen. Because simula-
tion does not disturb the real system, it can serve as a “pre-service test” to try
out new policies and decision rules for operating a system, rather than taking
the risk of experimenting directly on the real system. This advantage, as men-
tioned by many authors (Schriber, 1991; Pegden et al., 1995; Banks et al., 1996),
especially benefits companies in providing a look into the future.
The simulation method has also some disadvantages, as listed in the following.
• Model-building requires special training.
• Simulation results may be difficult to interpret.
• Simulation modeling and analysis can be time consuming and expensive.
• Simulation may be used inappropriately, especially when an analytical solution
is preferable.
However, these four disadvantages are not unavoidable. Professional simulation soft-
ware and the development of computer technology have facilitated the modeling and
the analysis of simulation. In respect to the last disadvantage, Naylor points out that
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simulation is considered as a relevant tool for analyzing economic systems when it is
not clear whether carrying out a study using analytic techniques is plausible (Naylor,
1971, pp. 299-300).
3.3 Computational Economics
Computational economics is a methodology for solving economic problems with the
help of computing machinery (Amman, 1997). Computational economics explores the
intersection of economics and computation. Applications of computational methods
are not restricted to a specific branch of economics, but rather widespread throughout
the major subject fields in economics.
Areas encompassed under computational economics include agent-based compu-
tational modeling, computational econometrics and statistics, computational finance,
computational modeling of dynamic macroeconomic systems, of transaction costs, com-
putational tools for the design of automated Internet markets, programming tools
specifically designed for computational economics, and pedagogical tools for the teach-
ing of computational economics. Any line of economic research that uses the method-
ology fits the definition of computational economics. The only restriction is that the
methodology has a value added in terms of (economic) problem solving (Lakatos, 1970).
Broadly, the computational methods can be classified into two categories, depend-
ing on their application context. The first encompasses the use of numerical methods
to solve “high-rationality” models that are too difficult or cumbersome to handle an-
alytically. The second approach is known as agent-based computational economics
(ACE). In this approach, agents are programmed to use simple rules of behavior to
respond to their environment. Here “agent” refers broadly to a bundle of data and
behavioral methods representing an entity constituting part of a computationally con-
structed world. The computation model is then used to study the aggregate patterns
that emerge when such simple rules interact.
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3.4 The Applied Approach: Computer-based Sim-
ulation
In the presented work, computer-based simulation is used as the main research method.
It is explained in the following why simulation is necessary and appropriate for the
presented work.
This study is interested in the competition between online auction marketplaces, in
which each marketplace may contain a large population of participants. The research
problem investigated has the property of quantitative uncertainty. The outcome of
competition can be influenced by various factors in continuous time periods. In such a
context, conducting computational experiments via simulation is recommended (Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1996), that is, to model the phenomenon as faithfully as possible
and then to rely on a computer-based simulation study to analyze it. Computer-based
simulations are able to present the abstraction of the real system and ideally character-
ize the essential properties of the system. Simulation can also greatly expand the set
of models that can be evaluated and estimated for reasonable computer costs (Stern,
1997).
Besides, the simulation technique can also be utilized for the study of the dynamic
behavior of a system. For dynamic structural problems, surveys already provide promi-
nent roles for simulation methods (see (Parkes, 1994) and (Rust, 1994)).
Howrey and Kleijnen point out that in many cases, it is not obvious whether sim-
ulation or an analytical solution would be more appropriate for a particular model.
However, there are some cases in which it would be questioned as to whether it would
be worth the time and effort to find an analytical solution if such a solution existed in
the first place. But it is quite possible that a numerical solution or the simulation of a
model provides the analyst with much of the information that is needed regarding the
behavior of the particular system. Even if an analytical solution exists, results from
simulations can also work as a validation of the analytic results (Howrey and Kleijnen,
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1971). Naylor also points out that in many cases, this simulated data may prove to be
completely adequate, particularly if the model of the economic system under study is
sensitive only to large changes in the values of the simulated input data (Naylor, 1971,
p. 7).
Another advantage of using the simulation approach in the presented work is that
competition can be studied in marketplaces comprised of boundedly rational agents.
As pointed out in Section 3.1, many analytical works are based on an unrealistic
picture of human decision making. Economic agents are portrayed as fully rational
Bayesian maximizers of subjective utility. In fact, there is overwhelming experimen-
tal evidence for substantial deviations from Bayesian rationality (Kahnemann et al.,
1982): people do not obey Bayes’ rule, their probability judgments fail to satisfy basic
requirements like monotonicity with respect to set inclusion, and they do not have
consistent preferences, even in situations involving no risk or uncertainty (see (Selten,
1991) for a more detailed discussion).
H. A. Simon created the beginnings of a theory of bounded rationally (Simon, 1957).
Bounded rationality is not irrationality; rather, it refers to the rational principles that
underlie non-optimizing adaptive behavior of real people. Boundedly rational decision
making necessarily involves non-optimizing procedures. Sometimes the term is also
used in connection with theories about optimization under some cognitive bounds.
Computational approaches are often used to investigate problems with boundedly
rational agents (Carley and Prietula, 1994; Feldman, 1962). It is relatively easy to
model agents by simulations, who are cognitively restricted, task oriented, and socially
situated. Section 4.5 returns to this issue, and describes the principles of decision-
making in the presented work under the assumption of bounded rationality.
Due to the above reasons, computer-based simulation is used as the research method-
ology in the presented study.
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3.5 Terminology
This section gives the definitions of the most important terms in simulations. Besides
the simulation concept proposed by Kleijnen in Section 3.2, Shannon also gives a
complete definition of simulation.
Definition 3.1 (Simulation). Simulation is a process of designing a computerized
model of a system (or process) and conducting experiments with this model for the
purpose either of understanding the behavior of the system or of evaluating various
strategies of the operation of the system. (Shannon, 1975, pp. 289-301)
Naylor’s definition of simulation emphasizes the use of computer technology in
conducting simulations.
Definition 3.2 (Computer-based Simulation). Simulation is a numerical technique
for conducting experiments with certain types of mathematical models which describe
the behavior of a complex system on a digital computer over extended periods of time.
(Naylor, 1971, p. 2)
Definition 3.3 (Simulation Model). A model can be defined in general as a simplified
representation of the original object or system in the real world. Simulation models
consist of building a virtual world out of small components. The important characteris-
tic of simulation model is that it enables an experimental approach. The experimenter
is able to change parts of the model and to observe the resulting behavior. (Brooks
et al., 2001, pp. 4-5)
A simulation model contains various elements, as defined in (Graybeal and Pooch,
1980, p. 12) and (Brooks et al., 2001, p. 13). A real-world object modeled in a sim-
ulation model is called an entity. Characteristics or properties of entities are called
attributes. Any process that causes changes in a system is called an activity. A de-
scription of all the entities, attributes, and activities, as they exist at some point in
time, is called the state of the system. The simulation executive is the part of the
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simulation that provides overall control. It is the architecture that carries out the
simulation run.
Simulation models can be categorized depending on how the time is represented
and whether they include any randomness. Simulation models that do not include the
time at all are called static models. However, most simulation models do include the
time because it is the changes of the system over time that are of interest. Such models
are called dynamic models.
In dynamic models, the variations over time can be simulated in two different ways.
Continuous models represent continual changes and often use differential equations, so
that the behavior in the model is always altering. A simulation system based on a
continuous model is then a continuous system, and is characterized by smooth changes
in the system state.
On the other hand, in a discrete model, behavior only changes at a particular
instance of an event (or time), with constant behavior between the events. A simulation
system based on a discrete model is then a discrete system, and is characterized by
discontinuous changes in the system state.
Random numbers are used in simulation to simulate variable, unpredictable behav-
ior such as the time at which the next customer will arrive at a bank or the time at
which a machine will break down. A great advantage of simulation is its ability to
model variable behavior in this way. Models that include random numbers are called
stochastic models, whereas those which not are called deterministic models. In a system
based on a deterministic model, the response of the system is completely determined
by its initial state and input. Compared to that, the response of a stochastic system
may take a range of values, given the initial system state.
What is worth mentioning is that in business systems, it is usually unnecessary
to model changes continuously and so a discrete model provides a simpler and more
appropriate representation. Besides, most Operational Research simulation models are
dynamic, discrete, and stochastic.
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3.6 A Typical Simulation Study
Computer simulation experiments with models of economic systems usually involve a
procedure that consists of the following six steps. Note that a simulation study is
not a simple sequential process; it may be necessary to go back to a previous step in
conducting the study.
1. Formulation of the problem
At the start of a simulation study there is some real-world problem that needs
to be tackled. This might be a shortcoming with an existing system, or a need
to investigate the workings of a proposed system. The task of the modeler is to
understand the system, to extract the essence of the system without including
unnecessary details, and to extract and formulate the questions that are to be
answered.
2. Formulation of a mathematical model
For the questions proposed, a mathematical model should be developed to for-
mally describe the system. The mathematical model should be suitable for tack-
ling the questions; however, it is worth mentioning that modeling is considered a
creative activity and there are no established, published principles (Banks, 1998,
p. 32).
3. Development of a computer program
Based on the design of the conceptual model, a computer model is developed.
The computer model is used to develop solutions to the real world problem and/or
to obtain a better understanding of the real world.
4. Verification and validation of the model
Verification refers to the proof that the simulation program is a faithful repre-
sentation of the system model. Validation refers to the proof that the model is a
correct representation of the real system. It is worth mentioning that the process
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of verification and validation should not be seen as a stage within a simulation
study, but as a process that continues throughout the whole simulation study.
5. Experimental Design
Because a simulation model cannot directly determine the best procedure, but
simply predicts the outcome of specific policies and procedures, a great many
experiments may be required to obtain a good understanding. Experimental
design refers to a sequence of simulation runs in which parameters are varied, with
both economic and statistical methods considered in achieving some specified
goals.
6. Data analysis
Data analysis is the process of looking at and summarizing data with the intent to
extract useful information and develop conclusions. Since a simulation is in many
cases a computer-based statistical sampling experiment, in a sound simulation
study, statistical techniques must be used to analyze the output of the simulated
system.
The above procedure is also shown in Figure 3.1. Once satisfactory solutions or
better understandings of the real-world problem have been found, these can then be
published to add to the existing scientific knowledge, or be implemented in order to
effect improvement in the real world.
3.7 Summary
Traditional theories of the oligopoly and duopoly are often based on fairly strong (and
frequently unrealistic) assumptions, since otherwise it may lead to models of such a
complex nature that they would be impossible to solve or to interpret. Nevertheless,
there has not been a very high degree of correlation between the behavior of actual
business firms and the behavior of the hypothetical firms described by the mathematical
constructs of classical oligopoly and duopoly theory.
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Figure 3.1: The procedures of a simulation study.
The arrival of computer techniques enables studies of oligopoly and duopoly prob-
lems with a set of highly detailed assumptions, which can be more compatible with the
real world than those in analytical solutions. The presented work uses a numerical so-
lution, or, to be more precise, uses computer-based simulation to study the competition
between two e-auction marketplaces.

Chapter 4
Simulation Model
This chapter introduces the simulation model. Section 4.1 describes the economic en-
vironment where the competition takes place. Afterward, the auction mechanism, the
agents, and the decision space are introduced separately in Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
Section 4.5 introduces the concept of bounded rationality, which is an important as-
sumption in the model. The payoff calculations of the agents are specified in Section 4.6.
This is the basis for the decision-making of agents, which are described in Section 4.7.
A short summary is given at the end of this chapter.
4.1 Economic Environment
The simulation model considers two e-auction marketplaces, denoted by MA and MB.
The marketplaces provide homogeneous auction services. It is assumed that in each
marketplace, only one auction is being conducted. There is a large population of sellers
and buyers, and each of them chooses one of the two marketplaces and participates
in the auction hosted by that marketplace. One can only participate in one of the
marketplaces at a time.
In the simulation model, each participant is considered as an agent. Let the size of
the population be n, and any agent of the population be either a seller or a buyer. The
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n agents consist of s sellers and b buyers, and the number of sellers is smaller than the
number of buyers.
The simulation consists of multiple simulation rounds. In every round, each agent
takes part in one auction. Sellers offer their items and buyers bid for the items. The
buyers who win the items and the winning prices of the items are determined by the
auctions. Based on those auction outcomes, each agent independently decides which
marketplace to join in the next round — whether to stay in his current marketplace or
switch to the other marketplace.
To put it more clearly, a simulation round consists of the following four steps.
Step 1: Each agent makes a decision about which marketplace to join.
Step 2: Each seller offers his item. All items are homogeneous goods. Each buyer
receives his private valuation for one of the items and submits a bid.
Step 3: Auctions are conducted simultaneously in the two marketplaces.
Step 4: All agents are informed about the auction results. Each seller knows at what
price he sold his item. Each buyer is informed of the winning price and whether
he acquired an item. Moreover, the winning prices in both marketplaces are
publicly known.
A simulation round, as described above, is conducted repeatedly in a simulation. De-
note the simulation round that is repeated for the t-th time by Rt. At time t = 1, that
is, in the first simulation round, each agent randomly decides which marketplace to join.
In the following simulation rounds, each agent makes decisions in order to maximize
his payoff. The decision-making process is described in Section 4.6 and Section 4.7.
4.2 Auction Mechanism
A uniform-price auction is used in the simulation model. It is a multi-unit sealed-bid
auction, in which units offered by the sellers are sold at the same winning price. The
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winning price in this model is determined by the highest rejected bid among the buyers.
Sellers are assumed to be the price takers, and have a reserve price of zero for the items
to offer.
For example, consider an auction with three sellers (each of which has one unit to
offer) and five buyers (with single-unit demands). Suppose the buyers’ bids are 1.0,
3.0, 5.0, 7.0, and 9.0, respectively. The three buyers whose bids are 5.0, 7.0, and 9.0
respectively, are the winners. Each of them obtains one unit with a price of 3.0, which
is the fourth highest bid among the buyers. Moreover, if the number of sellers is equal
to or larger than the number of buyers, the winning price is set to zero.
Similar mechanisms are often applied in electronic markets. For example, one of
the auction mechanisms used by eBay is the “dutch auction.”13 Despite its name, this
auction is not what is generally called a “dutch auction” in auction theory. It is rather
a multiple item auction, in which one seller offers multiple, identical items for sale, and
many buyers bid for those items. This type of auction can have several winners, who
pay the same price.
From buyers’ points of view, eBay’s mechanism is similar to the uniform auction
used in this study, because in both cases the winners pay the same price. The only
difference is that a buyer in a dutch auction on eBay can bid for several identical items,
while in this model a buyer can only bid for one item. On the seller side, in an eBay
dutch auction, only one seller, who offers multiple identical items, is involved. In this
model, the uniform auction may contain many sellers, and each seller offers only one
item. However, a seller on eBay can be considered as a group of sellers, each selling a
single item. The decision of an eBay seller represents the joint decision of the group of
sellers. From this point of view, the two mechanisms are also similar to sellers.
13See http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/buyer-multiple.html.
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4.3 Agents
Every agent in the simulation model is either a seller or a buyer. Throughout the
simulation, an agent never changes his role. This means that, for example, if an agent
is designated as a buyer, he will be a buyer in all simulation rounds. If not particularly
mentioned as a seller or buyer, an agent is generally denoted by a.
Sellers Among all n agents there are s sellers, and an individual seller is denoted
by sj, j = 1, 2, ..., s. A seller offers one item in each simulation round, and in each
round he offers his item in exactly one of the two marketplaces. He receives the price
which is determined by the auction. Sellers are assumed to be price-takers, and to have
a reserve price of zero for the item to sell. The items offered by sellers are assumed to
be identical.
Buyers Among all n agents there are b buyers, and an individual buyer is denoted
by bk, k = 1, 2, ..., b. In every simulation round, each buyer seeks to acquire one item.
Buyers have private valuations for the items, and the valuations are independently
drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval of [0, v¯b], v¯b > 0. In order to obtain
one item, each buyer submits a bid in the auction held at the marketplace that he
currently participates in.
It is a well-known result of auction theory that in a second-price auction with
private valuations, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer to bid true valuation
(Krishna, 2002, p. 15). In a uniform-price auction as in this model, it can be easily
proved that bidding their true valuations is a weakly dominant strategy for buyers as
well (see proof in Appendix A).
Each buyer receives a new valuation in each round. The valuation is only valid
in the current round. Moreover, buyers neither know the identity of their trading
partners, nor do they have any preference with whom to trade.
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4.4 Decision Space
In the model, agents make decisions on which of the two marketplaces to join. In each
round, a seller takes one of the following two actions:
1. participate in marketplace MA.
2. participate in marketplace MB.
As pointed out in Section 4.3, it is a weakly dominant strategy for buyers to bid
their true valuation. Thus, the decision on how much to bid is not explicitly modeled,
and a buyer’s decision in a simulation round is to participate in either MA or MB, too.
In a word, sellers and buyers have the same decision space.
Denote the decision space of an agent by X. X = {MA,MB}. The decision space
remains the same throughout the simulation. Given a simulation round Rt, the decision
of a seller sj in this round is then x
t
sj
, it should be either MA or MB. Similarly, the
decision of a buyer bk in round R
t is denoted by xtbk .
4.5 Bounded Rationality
The neoclassical economic theory assumes that agents are rational. This means that
the agents know the utility function of other agents (or the probability that other
agents have these utility functions), they calculate the possible actions of their own
as well as other agents, and make decisions that maximize their payoffs. However,
this assumption is rather demanding and implausible for the problem studied in the
presented work.
In this model, agents are assumed to be “bounded rational.” The originator of the
phrase, Herbert Simon, defines a choice with bounded rationality as “a rational choice
that takes into account the cognitive limitations of the decision-maker — limitations of
both knowledge and computational capacity” (Simon, 1987). In contrast to the rational
scenario, agents are endowed with more or less limited cognitive and computational
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capacities, but such weak rationality is compensated by repetitions in the simulation.
As time goes, agents summarize their experiences in actions by their payoffs received
in the past. They find optimal actions by applying ameliorating rules which reinforce
good actions and weaken bad actions.
Derived from the assumption of bounded rationality, agents in this model are as-
sumed to take the following principles in decision-making.
• Agents are not able to calculate other agents’ possible payoffs and actions. There-
fore, they consider only their own choices and calculate only their own payoffs.
• Once an action turns out to have maximized an agent’s payoff, the agent believes
“what worked well in the past may also work well in the future,” and then just
sticks to this action in the next round.
4.6 Payoff Specification
In a simulation round, agents first participate in a marketplace, and then calculate
their payoffs upon receiving the winning prices of the auctions. This section defines
how an agent’s payoff is determined. According to the assumptions in Section 4.5,
agents calculate their own payoffs, without considering the choices and payoffs of other
agents.
4.6.1 Payoff of a Buyer
In each simulation round, different agents may join different marketplaces. An agent
may also join different marketplaces in different simulation rounds. Given a simulation
round, the marketplace that an agent a currently participates in is referred to by
Ma, and the other marketplace by Mâ. Correspondingly, the winning prices in the
marketplaces are p(Ma) and p(Mâ), respectively.
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Denote the valuation that a buyer bk receives in round R
t by vtbk . As pointed out in
Section 4.3, it is a (weakly) dominant bidding strategy for each buyer to bid his true
valuation, thus the bid by buyer bk in R
t is simply vtbk .
The payoff of a buyer bk, who participates in market Mbk in round R
t, is defined in
the following equation.
pitbk(Mbk) =
 vtbk − pt(Mbk) , if vtbk > pt(Mbk)0 , otherwise (4.1)
Since a buyer participates only in one marketplace, strictly speaking, a buyer has
no payoff with respect to the other marketplace. However, this model proposes a
“presumed payoff” concept, which follows an intuitive way of thinking by individuals.
The following example explains this in detail.
Example 1. Consider a buyer who currently participates in marketplace MA with a
private valuation of 12.0. The winning prices in the two marketplaces are p(MA) = 10.0
and p(MB) = 8.0 respectively. The buyer’s payoff in MA, according to Equation 4.1, is
simply 12.0− 10.0 = 2.0. Although this buyer has not participated in MB, observing a
winning price of 8.0 in MB, he might think: if I had been in that marketplace, I would
have won in that auction as well, but with a price of 8.0 — choosing marketplace MB
seems to be more profitable for me.
To conclude from the above example, an agent always calculates his payoff in his
current marketplace (named as his real payoff in the following). Besides, the agent
also calculates his presumed payoff, which refers to a payoff that the agent subjectively
thinks he would have received, if he had participated in the other marketplace. It
is calculated in the same way as his real payoff, except that the price of the current
marketplace is substituted by the price in the other marketplace (see Equation 4.2).
pitbk(Mb̂k) =
 vtbk − pt(Mb̂k) , if vtbk > pt(Mb̂k)0 , otherwise (4.2)
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4.6.2 Payoff of a Seller
In Section 4.3 it is assumed that all sellers’ valuations of their offered items are zero.
Thus, the real payoff of a seller sj in marketplace Msj simply equals the winning price
in that marketplace.
pitsj(Msj) = p
t(Msj) (4.3)
Analogously to the presumed payoff of a buyer, a seller’s presumed payoff in the other
marketplace Mî is given in Equation 4.4
pitsj(Mŝj) = p
t(Mŝj) (4.4)
4.6.3 Preference Generation
After calculating his real and presumed payoff, each agent derives his preference for
one marketplace according to his real payoff and presumed payoff. The principle is
rather simple: the marketplace that yields a higher payoff is preferred.
If, in a simulation round Rt, an agent a’s current marketplace provides a higher
or equal payoff compared to the other marketplace, then the agent prefers the current
marketplace. Let ψta = 0 stand for this case. Otherwise, the agent prefers to switch to
the other marketplace, and in this case ψta takes the value of 1. Equation 4.5 presents
the function ψta in formula.
ψta =
 0 , if pita(Ma) ≥ pita(Mâ)1 , otherwise (4.5)
4.7 Heuristics in Decision Making
This section describes the decision-making process, that is, how an agent finally derives
a decision regarding which marketplace to join. The following information is known
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for an agent a, when he is about to decide which marketplace to join in the simulation
round Rt+1.
1. The agent’s choice in round Rt
The choice of a seller sj is x
t
sj
, and it is xtbk for a buyer bk.
2. The agent’s real payoff and presumed payoff in Rt
The real payoff and presumed payoff of a seller sj are pi
t
sj
(Msj) and pi
t
sj
(Mŝj)
respectively, and for a buyer bk they are pi
t
bk
(Mbk) and pi
t
bk
(Mb̂k) accordingly.
3. The agent’s preference for one marketplace
The preference is generated based on the agent’s real and presumed payoff, and
it is denoted by ψtsj for a seller sj, and ψ
t
bk
for a buyer bk.
The decision-making process of an agent is differentiated according to an agent’s
preference, that is, is differentiated in the following two cases.
Case I: An agent prefers the current marketplace.
Case II: An agent prefers the other marketplace.
Section 4.7.1 and Section 4.7.2 define the decision-making process under these two
cases, respectively.
4.7.1 Case I: Preference for the Current Marketplace
According to the assumption of bounded rationality in Section 4.5, an agent follows
the principle “what worked well in the past may also work well in the future.” If, for an
agent a, ψta equals zero, which means that his current marketplace has “worked well,”
the agent simply sticks to his choice. Equation 4.6 and 4.7 show this in formulae.
xt+1sj = x
t
sj
, if ψtsj = 0 (4.6)
xt+1bk = x
t
bk
, if ψtbk = 0 (4.7)
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4.7.2 Case II: Preference for the Other Marketplace
If, for an agent a, ψta equals one, which means that the other marketplace is preferred,
simply following this preference may not ensure a maximal payoff. There are several
reasons for this.
• The presumed payoff is calculated in a subjective way. If an agent had joined
the other marketplace, this might have changed the winning price. Therefore,
the preference that is generated based on the real and presumed payoff may not
precisely reflect the decision problem. Therefore, although an agent clearly knows
his preference, he does not know the actual accurate payoffs.
• Agents are not able to forecast the future actions of other agents. Again, due
to limitations in information and computation abilities, agents can not calcu-
late probabilities over their decision spaces which take into account every other
agent’s probabilities in taking certain actions. When an agent switches to the
other marketplace in a new simulation round, other agents may also adapt their
decisions at the same time. This naturally leads to changes of the winning prices
and consequently changes of the agents’ payoffs.
• Agents’ valuations are randomly generated in each simulation round. In each
round, buyers’ valuations for the items are redrawn. Thus, even if the number
of buyers and the number of sellers are fixed in one marketplace, the winning
price in this marketplace may still vary from round to round. Consequently, the
payoffs and preferences of the agents may vary.
Due to the above reasons, when an agent prefers the other marketplace, he may
not simply take an action that follows his preference. Rather, each agent may generate
a probability in which he follows his preference and moves to the other marketplace.
Let dt+1a represent the probability that the agent a joins the other marketplace in the
simulation round Rt+1. It is determined by two parameters: 1) the indicator of the
difference between the real and presumed payoff; and 2) the discount factor.
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4.7.2.1 The Payoff Difference Indicator
It is intuitive and reasonable for an agent to consider the difference between his real
payoff and presumed payoff. For example, consider that a seller’s real payoff is 6.5, and
his presumed payoff is 8.5, that is, his presumed payoff is higher than his real payoff
with a difference of 2.0. The seller prefers to switch to the other marketplace. Now
suppose that his presumed payoff is 12.5, and thus the payoff difference is as high as
6.0. Compared to the former case, it is natural that the seller be subjectively more
motivated to join the other marketplace. Therefore, in this model, a payoff difference
indicator θ is introduced to present an agent’s “eagerness,” or in other words, the
“degree of motivation,” to switch to the other marketplace. The payoff difference
indicator of an agent a (denoted by θta), is determined by Equation 4.8.
θta = µ ∗
pita(Mâ)− pita(Ma)
pita(Mâ) + pi
t
a(Ma)
(4.8)
Given an agent’s real payoff pita(Ma), it is clear from Equation 4.8 that the larger his
presumed payoff pita(Mâ), the larger the payoff difference indicator θ
t
a. µ is a scaling
coefficient that lies in the interval of [0, 1].
4.7.2.2 The Discount Factor
The discount factor is used to present an agent’s “sensitiveness” of the payoff difference.
The underlying principle of the discount factor is that the longer an agent stays in a
marketplace, the less he is influenced by the payoff difference. This principle actually
reflects several considerations when agents trade via auctions in reality. For example,
the longer an agent stays and trades in a marketplace, the higher his reputation might
be, and therefore the less he is motivated to switch when the other marketplace occa-
sionally yields a higher payoff. Another example could be that an agent has switching
costs, such as learning how to use the services provided by the marketplace that the
agent switched to.
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On the other hand, after an agent has switched to the other marketplace, his dis-
count factor should change in a way that the agent is more influenced by the payoff
difference. One possible motivation from the real world is that an agent often pays
more attention to his payoff than his reputation, when he first joins a marketplace.
The agent does not attain much of a reputation in the new marketplace in a short
time; in the meantime, his reputation in the former marketplace is much less impor-
tant after the switch. Therefore, the agent is more sensitive to the variations of his
payoffs. Another possible argument is that agents are uncertain about the expectations
due to the reasons mentioned in the beginning of Section 4.7.2. Because of this, an
agent is likely to be quite sensitive to the dynamics of the payoffs immediately after a
switch.
The value of the discount factor is always updated after a decision is made. An
agent a in the simulation round Rt compares his decision in round (xta) with his decision
in the former round (xt−1a ). If the decisions are the same, that is, the agent has stayed
in the same marketplace, then the value of f ta decreases. Contrarily, f
t
a increases if the
decisions are different. Equation 4.9 defines the calculation of f ta in a formula. The
initial value of the discount factor is set to 1.0, that is, f 1a = 1.0.
f ta =

1
2
∗ [f t−1a + 1] , if t ≥ 2 and xta 6= xt−1a
1
2
∗ f t−1a , if t ≥ 2 and xta = xt−1a
1 , if t = 1
(4.9)
Although the value of the discount factor is determined only by its formal value
and the agent’s decisions in two successive rounds, by iteration f ta is able to take into
account all former decisions. An example is given in the following, showing how the
value of the discount factor varies according to a series of decisions over time.
Example 2. Consider a simulation that runs eight simulation rounds. That is, the
value of t increases from one to eight (see the first row of Table 4.1). Assume that
the decisions of an agent a in those rounds are observed as listed in the second row of
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Table 4.1. The discount factor is calculated in each round according to Equation 4.9,
and the values are listed in the third row of the table.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
xta MA MB MB MB MA MA MB MA
f ta 1 1 0.5 0.25 0.625 0.313 0.657 0.829
Table 4.1: An example of the discount factor.
From Example 2 one can see that the discount factor has the following features:
• The value of f ta decreases if an agent sticks to his former decision and stays in
the same marketplace.
• The value of f ta increases if an agent switches to a different marketplace.
• The value f ta varies in the range of (0, 1].
• f ta = 1 holds as long as an agent keeps switching between the two marketplaces.
The first two features show that the calculation of the discount factor reflects the
changes of an agent’s sensitiveness of payoff in the correct way. The latter two features
make sure that the value of the discount factor can be used as a discounting coefficient
to the payoff difference.
After an agent a in the simulation round Rt has calculated the payoff difference indi-
cator and updated the discount factor, he is then able to calculate his probability of
switching to the other marketplace in the next round, denoted by dt+1a . Equation 4.10
and 4.11 present the function with respect to sellers and buyers respectively.
dt+1sj = θ
t
sj
∗ f tsj (4.10)
dt+1bk = θ
t
bk
∗ f tbk (4.11)
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After the agent a has calculated the probability, he makes a decision in the next
round Rt+1 based on this probability, and then acts following the decision, which is
either to stay in the same marketplace as in round Rt, or to switch to the other mar-
ketplace in round Rt+1.
An example is given at the end of this subsection, showing the decision-making of
an agent in Case II — the case that an agent does not prefer the current marketplace.
Example 3. Suppose that in a simulation round R4, a buyer b18 joins the marketplace
MA, that is, x
4
b18
= MA. He calculates the payoffs after the two auctions are executed,
and it turns out that his real payoff pi4b18(MA) is 2.01 and his presumed payoff pi
4
b18
(MB)
is 8.818. Clearly, MB is more preferred than the buyer’s current marketplace MA.
Suppose the scaling coefficient µ = 0.8. According to Equation 4.8 the payoff differ-
ence indicator θ4b18 = 0.8 ∗ (8.818− 2.01)/(8.818 + 2.01) = 0.503. Suppose that the dis-
count factor f 4b18 is updated with a value of 0.5. Thus, the buyer’s probability of switching
to MB in the next round R
5, according to Equation 4.11, is d5b18 = θ
4
b18
∗ f 4b18 = 0.252.
The buyer then draws a decision.14 With a probability of 0.252, the decision will be
MB, and then the buyer joins MB in round R
5, that is, x5b18 = MB. With a probability
of 0.748 the buyer decides to stay in MA, and x
5
b18
= MA.
4.7.3 Decision-making Considering Listing Fees
One objective of the presented work is to study how the market evolves when the
marketplaces impose listing fees on the sellers. So far, the simulation model has not
included the parameter of the listing fee. In this subsection, the simulation model is
14The implementation of probability in computer algorithm is done as follows. Suppose that the
probability is 0.5. Draw a random number q in the range of [0,1]. Obviously, the probability that
q ≤ 0.5 is 0.5, and the probability that q > 0.5 is also 0.5. Similarly, given any probability p, we just
draw a random number q, and compare q with p. The probability that q ≤ p is p, and the probability
that q > p is 1− p. Therefore, the probability p can be implemented by drawing a random number q
and then judging whether q ≤ p.
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extended, so that it considers the listing fee as a further parameter.
A listing fee is a price that a marketplace charges for listing an item or items for
sale. Only sellers are charged a listing fee at the time of listing. Moreover, this fee is
charged independently of any transaction, meaning that it is not refundable, no matter
whether the offered item is sold or not. A marketplace usually charges the same listing
fee to all participating sellers.
Intuitively, a seller prefers a marketplace with a higher price but he also has to
consider the amount of the listing fee. His payoff in a marketplace is simply the price
he receives minus the listing fee he must pay. In the case that the listing fee equals or is
even higher than the price, a seller simply receives a payoff of zero. Let l(Msj) represent
the amount of the listing fee that a seller sj is charged by his current marketplace
Msj , and let l(Mŝj) represent the listing fee charged in the other marketplace. The
calculation of the real payoff and the presumed payoff is then modified, as shown in
Equation 4.12 and 4.13, respectively.
pitsj(Msj) =
 pt(Msj)− lt(Msj) , if pt(Msj) > lt(Msj)0 , otherwise (4.12)
pitsj(Mŝj) =
 pt(Mŝj)− lt(Mŝj) , if pt(Mŝj) > lt(Mŝj)0 , otherwise (4.13)
Buyers are not charged with the listing fee, therefore their payoff functions need not
be changed. However, they are indirectly influenced by the listing fees, because they
consider the prices in their payoff functions, and the prices are actually determined by
the buyers’ bids as well as the number of sellers and buyers in the marketplaces.
No further change of the simulation model is necessary, because the variables of
listing fees are already modeled within the payoff functions, and the payoff calculations
are the basis of all further calculations in the decision-making process. From this point
of view, the model has its advantage in extension.
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4.8 Summary
This chapter proposes a simulation model of the competition between two e-auction
marketplaces. The model defines the competition scenario, the agents who partici-
pate in the marketplaces, the agents’ decision spaces as well as their decision-making
processes. The simulation model is further extended to the case where the two mar-
ketplaces impose listing fees. In the next chapter, the simulation experiment based on
the simulation model is designed.
Chapter 5
Design of the Simulation
Experiment
In Chapter 4, a simulation model of two competing e-auction marketplaces is proposed.
The model is implemented as a computer program so that the competition can be simu-
lated(Chen and Maekioe, 2006). This chapter describes how the computer simulations
should be conducted for the purpose of this study.
In a computer simulation experiment, as in any experiment, careful attention should
be devoted to the experimental design. Law and Kelton point out that “carefully
designed experiments are much more efficient than a ‘hit-or-miss’ sequence of runs in
which we simply try a number of alternative configurations unsystematically to see
what happens,” (Law and Kelton, 1999, p. 623).
In order to design a simulation experiment, two elements — factor and response —
need to be defined first. Both terms refer to variables. The input parameters are called
factors, and the output performance measures are called responses (Law and Kelton,
1999, p. 622). Section 5.1 defines the factors and responses in this study.
Factors include fixed factors and experimental factors. It depends on the goals of
the study rather than on the inherent form of the model as to which input parameters
should be considered as the fixed factors of the simulation, and which should be consid-
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ered as the experimental factors. Section 5.2 introduces the three fixed factors in the
presented work, and a pre-stage simulation study is conducted in order to determine
the appropriate values of those fixed factors.
Based on the research questions and the pre-stage simulation, several treatments are
designed, each of which consists of several different simulation settings. The treatments
and the settings are introduced in detail in Section 5.3.
5.1 Factors and Responses
5.1.1 Factors
Table 5.1 lists the factors included in the simulation model.15 Kleijnen has suggested
that for a standard design of experiment, a simulation system should not deal with
more than about fifteen factors (Kleijnen, 1998, p. 175). Therefore, the number of
factors in this work is appropriate.
Parameter Definition
n Total number of agents (including sellers and buyers)
s Total number of sellers
b Total number of buyers
s1(MA) Number of sellers in MA at simulation initialization
b1(MA) Number of buyers in MA at simulation initialization
s1(MB) Number of sellers in MB at simulation initialization
b1(MB) Number of buyers in MB at simulation initialization
l(MA) Listing fee charged to sellers in MA
l(MB) Listing fee charged to sellers in MB
v¯b Upper bound of a buyer’s valuation
(the lower bound is zero by default)
µ Scaling coefficient used in payoff calculation
z Number of repeated rounds in a simulation run
Table 5.1: Input factors.
15Refer to Chapter 4 to see how these factors are incorporated into the simulation model.
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The last three factors from Table 5.1, i.e., the upper bound of a buyer’s valuation
(v¯b), the scaling coefficient of the payoff difference (µ), and the number of repeated
rounds in a simulation run (z), are set as fixed factors in the simulation experiment.
The other factors are the experimental factors.
Since each factor can be set with many different values, the combination of the
factors generates a huge factor space. Clearly, it is neither computationally feasible nor
necessary to simulate every factor combination. Rather, multiple simulation settings
should be defined which on the one hand meet the interests of the study, and on
the other hand have the discriminatory power that facilitates easy analysis of the
simulation data. Section 5.3 defines how the experimental factors are combined in
various simulation settings.
5.1.2 Responses
A simulation can be considered as a mechanism that turns input parameters into
output measures. In a discrete event simulation, two types of variables are often used
for output data analysis — the counter variable and the system state variable (Ross,
1997). A counter variable counts the number of times that a certain event has occurred
by a certain time. A system state variable describes the “state of the system” at a
certain time. Whenever an “event” occurs, i.e., the values of the above variables change
or are updated, the relevant data that is of interest is collected as the output. In this
way, the evolution of the simulated system can be monitored.
Type Response Variable
Counter t: a counter of the number of simulated rounds
System pt(MA), p
t(MB): the prices of the auctions in round R
t;
state st(MA), b
t(MA), s
t(MB), b
t(MB): the distribution
of agents in the marketplaces in round Rt.
Table 5.2: Response variables.
Table 5.2 lists the response variables used in this work. The counter t is a discrete
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variable, which refers to the number of simulated rounds. The counter increases by one
in each simulation round, and a simulation run terminates in the simulation round in
which the counter equals the maximum limit z. There are two types of system state
variables — the winning prices of the auctions and the distribution of agents in the
two marketplaces MA and MB in a simulation round.
5.2 Simulation Trials
Before finalizing the design of the simulation settings, several trial simulations are
conducted and analyzed in this section. The purpose of the trials is to get a first
impression of the simulation dynamics and to verify whether the output is reasonable.
5.2.1 A Trial Run
The first trial simulation uses the settings shown in Table 5.3. Twenty agents are
simulated. At the beginning of the simulation, two sellers and five buyers join the
marketplace MA, while the remaining four sellers and nine buyers join the marketplace
MB. The valuations of the buyers are independently drawn from a uniform distribution
over the interval of [0, 10.0]. The coefficient µ is set to 0.1. The simulation runs for
fifty rounds.
n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB) µ v¯b z
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.1 10.0 50
Table 5.3: Simulation setting used in the trial simulation.
To give an overview of how agents select between the two marketplaces, Figure 5.1
shows the number of sellers and the number of buyers of each marketplace in each round.
In the first several rounds, one can see that agents switch between the marketplaces
quite frequently. However, in later rounds, the number of agents in each marketplace
remains more or less constant. Such stableness may occur in two situations. One is
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that no agent changes his location, and consequently there is no movement. The other
situation is that the movements from MA to MB exactly offset the movements from
MB to MA. The detailed simulation data shows that the stableness is observed because
the former is the case.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamics of the movements of agents in the trial simulation.
Table 5.4 lists the winning prices as well as the distribution of agents in each round.
In the first simulation round, the prices in the marketplaces turn out to be 4.402 and
5.958 respectively. The price difference is 1.556, and one buyer switches from MB to
MA in the second round.
This agent had randomly joined MB in the first round and receives a valuation of
6.324. Thus, as a buyer his real payoff is 0.366 and his presumed payoff in the other
marketplace, MA, is 1.922. Thus, he prefers to move to MA, and after calculation he
moves to MA with a probability 0.068. By drawing a random number, which turns out
to be 0.0327 and is smaller than 0.068, the agent follows his preference and joins MA
in the second round.16
Actually, there are several other buyers, who also prefer to switch from MB to MA
in the second round. However, according to the decision-making rules, they compute
16Refer to Section 4.6 and Section 4.7 for the decision-making process. See also Example 3 in
Section 4.7.2.
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Rt st(MA) b
t(MA) s
t(MB) b
t(MB) p
t(MA) p
t(MB)
1 2 5 4 9 4.402 5.958
2 2 6 4 8 5.998 5.341
3 2 6 4 8 1.305 4.431
4 1 6 5 8 7.234 1.418
5 1 5 5 9 2.097 2.641
6 1 5 5 9 7.582 4.693
7 1 5 5 9 5.958 7.582
8 1 5 5 9 6.469 5.958
9 1 5 5 9 6.469 4.657
10 1 5 5 9 6.469 5.843
11 1 5 5 9 3.09 5.839
12 1 5 5 9 5.325 5.365
13 1 5 5 9 3.078 2.427
14 1 5 5 9 5.843 2.097
15 1 5 5 9 4.559 5.626
16 1 5 5 9 6.631 4.955
17 1 5 5 9 5.958 3.676
18 1 5 5 9 5.154 2.812
19 1 5 5 9 6.324 4.548
20 1 5 5 9 5.551 3.078
21 1 5 5 9 6.695 0.521
22 1 5 5 9 5.341 1.305
23 1 5 5 9 6.469 1.305
24 1 5 5 9 5.998 4.402
25 1 5 5 9 6.762 5.573
26 1 5 5 9 1.531 6.580
27 1 5 5 9 3.09 2.641
28 1 5 5 9 5.573 3.090
29 1 5 5 9 9.665 5.573
30 1 5 5 9 7.582 5.573
31 1 5 5 9 6.58 3.104
32 1 5 5 9 5.551 4.402
33 1 5 5 9 5.365 2.812
34 1 5 5 9 5.431 5.084
35 1 5 5 9 7.693 1.844
36 1 5 5 9 6.631 3.104
37 1 5 5 9 6.909 5.154
38 1 5 5 9 4.955 1.769
39 1 5 5 9 9.84 5.084
40 1 5 5 9 4.402 2.812
41 1 5 5 9 8.607 4.839
42 1 5 5 9 5.551 4.955
43 1 5 5 9 5.839 5.843
44 1 5 5 9 4.839 2.812
45 1 5 5 9 5.341 3.700
46 1 5 5 9 3.078 1.531
47 1 5 5 9 3.676 4.402
48 1 5 5 9 7.649 5.154
49 1 5 5 9 5.958 2.423
50 1 5 5 9 6.631 5.365
Table 5.4: Dynamics of the prices and the distribution of agents in the trial simulation.
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their probabilities of moving, and it turns out that those buyers stay in MB in the
second round.
This simulation run uses a setting with only twenty agents. Because the agents are
distributed in the two marketplaces, the number of sellers and the number of buyers
in each single marketplace are even smaller. Thus, the movement of a single agent
may easily lead to large changes in the winning prices. This explains why in the third
round, one seller moves from MA to MB, and then the winning price in MA rises to
7.234 (which is much higher than its former value of 1.305 in R3), while the price in
MB decreases to 1.418 (which is much lower than its former value of 4.431 in R
3). Due
to this great change in the winning prices, it is observed that a buyer leaves MA and
joins MB in R
5.
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Figure 5.2: Dynamics of the winning prices in the trial simulation.
In fact, the prices are very sensitive throughout the simulation. Figure 5.2 shows
the dynamics of the winning prices in the two marketplaces. One can see that the
prices often vary significantly between two successive rounds, and this can be observed
throughout the simulation. For example, the price in MB is around 6.5 in round 26,
but it decreases to around 2.5 in the next round, R27. For another example, the price
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in MA jumps from around 5.0 in R
38 to almost 10.0 in the following round, R39, but
the value decreases again to a even lower value that is around 4.5 in R40.
One reason for this, as pointed out in the above, is that within a small population,
a single agent’s movement may cause big changes in the winning prices. However, it
does not explain why the prices still vary greatly after the round R5, in which every
agent chooses to stay in his marketplace, and the distribution of agents remains at
a state of s(MA) = 1, b(MA) = 5, s(MB) = 5, b(MB) = 9. Clearly, the demand-offer
relationship is not in balance in the two marketplaces, with MA containing one seller
but five buyers, while there are five times as many sellers but only two times as many
buyers in MB. Correspondingly, the price in MA is often much higher than in MB. It
seems unreasonable for the buyers in MA to stick to the high price and sellers in MB
to stick to the relatively low price.
There are three issues that jointly account for the phenomenon. One of the issues
is that the buyers’ valuations for the items are redrawn in each round. A buyer’s new
valuation is independent from his valuation in the former round. The buyers’ valuations
are also independent from each other in each round. Therefore, even if the number of
buyers and the number of sellers is fixed in one marketplace, the winning price in this
marketplace may still vary from round to round.17
The second contributing parameter is the discount factor f . For example, compare
the two rounds R3 and R26. In round 3, the price difference is 3.126, and in the next
round one seller chooses to move. In round R26, the winning prices are p26(MA) = 1.531
and p26(MB) = 6.58 respectively. However, no seller in MA moves, although the price
difference is as large as 5.049.18
This example shows the influence of the discount factor f . According to the simu-
lation model, the longer an agent stays in a marketplace, the lower is his incentive to
17It is shown in Section 6.1.2 that the prices vary less intensely during the stable state in the
simulation with a larger population of 300 agents.
18In this example, sellers are simply assumed as price-takers, therefore in each round the price
difference simply equals payoff difference for each seller.
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move, and this leads to the agent’s probability of moving being discounted. Table 5.4
shows that by round 26, each seller has continuously stayed in the same marketplace
for 22 rounds. Thus, the payoff difference 5.049 is greatly discounted by f , so that the
probability of moving is close to zero. In such a case, even a great change in the prices
might not be sufficient to make any agent change his choice of a marketplace.
Last but not least, the payoff indicator µ also partly leads to a distribution of agents
with an unbalanced demand-offer relationship. To see this, compare the two rounds
R6 and R26. In round 6, the price difference is 2.889 for sellers. This is almost double
compared to that of the first round, and the discount factor is not as small as in round
26. However, no seller chooses to move.
One reason for this is that the value of the coefficient µ, which is set to 0.1 in this
simulation run, might be too small. Remember that µ is a coefficient that lies in the
interval between 0 and 1.0. While the discount factor represents an agent’s opinion as
to how important payoff differences are, the value of µ represents a common opinion
of all agents, regarding the extent to which a payoff difference is important, and this
opinion is not changed throughout the simulation.
If µ is very small, according to Equation 4.8, no matter how big the payoff difference
is, it will be greatly scaled down, and the value of θ should be very small, too. This
means that even a big payoff difference might not be taken into great account. In
the extreme case where µ = 0, agents simply disregard their payoff differences and
they always stay in their current marketplaces. In another extreme case where µ = 1,
agents are then very sensitive to the payoff differences. In those two extreme cases, the
influence of µ on the decision is so large that it directly determines the system’s state
in the simulation.
5.2.2 Appropriate Values of the Fixed Factors
The analysis of the trial simulation shows that the simulation dynamics can be strongly
influenced by some fixed factors, rather than determined by the prices and the according
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payoff differences. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to find out the appropriate
values of the fixed factors.
5.2.2.1 The Upper Bound of Buyers’ Valuations
In the simulation model, each buyer’s valuation is drawn from a uniform distribution
over the interval from 0 to v¯b. So far, the simulations have set the interval as [0, 10.0].
It naturally comes to the question: Is this interval appropriate? How large should v¯b
be? Does the upper bound influence the dynamics of the agent movements? In this
subsection, simulation trials aim to answer these questions.
n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB) µ v¯b z
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.5 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.5 50.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.5 100.0 50
Table 5.5: Simulation settings in the pre-study of v¯b.
The simulation trials use the same settings, as listed in Table 5.5, except that v¯b is
set at different values. The three simulation trials evolve in a similar manner, and they
end in the same stable state of half-split of agents — three sellers and seven buyers
join MA, while the remaining three sellers and seven buyers participate in MB.
The average price difference is calculated for each simulation run. Since the buyers’
valuations are generated based on different scales of intervals among the three runs,
the prices of the three runs are expected to be significantly different from each other,
and so are the average price differences. For an easy comparison between the runs, the
relative price difference is introduced, which is calculated as shown in Equation 5.1.
relative price difference =
average price difference
v¯b
(5.1)
Table 5.6 shows the average price differences in the three runs as well as the cor-
responding relative price differences. From this table one can see that the average
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Distribution of agents Average price Relative price
v¯b s50(MA) b
50(MA) s
50(MB) b
50(MB) difference difference
10.0 3 7 3 7 1.546 0.155
50.0 3 7 3 7 9.419 0.188
100.0 3 7 3 7 19.617 0.173
Table 5.6: Average- and relative price difference of the simulations in the pre-study of
v¯b.
price difference is significantly larger, when buyers’ valuations are drawn from a larger
field, which is a rather intuitive result. However, the relative price differences of the
three runs are very close to each other in value. This means that changing the support
interval of the distribution does not significantly change the dynamics of the simula-
tions. In other words, how large v¯b should be set is not the crucial issue in the design
of the simulation experiment. Therefore, in the following simulations, v¯b is commonly
set to 10.0. That is, the buyers’ valuations are always drawn from the same uniform
distribution over the interval of [0, 10.0].
5.2.2.2 The Payoff Scaling Coefficient
Simulations in this subsection aim to find out an appropriate value of µ, so that the
agents’ decisions are mainly determined by payoff differences they receive, rather than
influenced by the value of µ.
In this subsection, there are ten simulation runs studied, each using one setting.
The ten settings are almost the same, as shown in Table 5.7, except that the value of
µ in those settings is set to 0.1, 0.2 up to 1.0 respectively.
The simulation run in which µ equals 0.1 has already been studied in Section 5.2.1.
The dynamics of the agents’ movements in the remaining nine simulation runs are all
similar to this trial simulation run. Each of the simulation runs evolves to a stable
state, in which every agent sticks with his current marketplace. Table 5.8 shows the
distribution of agents at the end of the simulation run in those ten settings.
It is known from the analysis in Section 5.2.1 that 0.1 is too small to be an appropri-
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n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB) µ v¯b z
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.1 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.2 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.3 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.4 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.5 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.6 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.7 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.8 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 0.9 10.0 50
20 6 14 2 5 4 9 1.0 10.0 50
Table 5.7: Simulation settings in the pre-study of µ.
Distribution of agents
Value of µ
s50(MA) b
50(MA) s
50(MB) b
50(MB)
0.1 1 5 5 9
0.2 2 5 4 9
0.3 2 6 4 8
0.4 3 7 3 7
0.5 3 7 3 7
0.6 2 5 4 9
0.7 2 4 4 10
0.8 3 7 3 7
0.9 2 5 4 9
1.0 4 10 2 4
Table 5.8: Distribution of agents at the end of the simulation runs. Simulations in the
pre-study of µ.
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ate value for µ, because agents would rather be “locked” in their current marketplaces
than make decisions based on their payoff differences. As one can see from Figure 5.1,
frequent switches of agents between the marketplaces are not observed, even in the
beginning of the simulation. Since the demand-offer situations are not balanced due
to the lock effect, it is not surprising to see that a large price difference still exists at
the end of the simulation, similar to that at simulation initialization. In other words,
if the agents are not locked due to too small a value, small price differences between
the marketplaces can be expected, especially in the stable state.
Table 5.9 lists the average price differences in the ten runs, in which µ takes the
value of 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0 respectively. The average price difference is given by calculating
the price difference in each simulation round, and then calculating the average for
fifty consecutive rounds in a simulation run. The table shows that the average price
difference is relatively small when µ lies between 0.2 and 0.5; the smallest average price
difference occurs when µ = 0.5. Therefore, 0.5 appears to be an appropriate value for
µ.
Value of µ Average price difference
0.1 2.320
0.2 1.717
0.3 1.911
0.4 1.712
0.5 1.546
0.6 2.220
0.7 2.461
0.8 2.057
0.9 2.069
1.0 2.293
Table 5.9: Average price differences of the simulations in the pre-study of µ.
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5.2.2.3 The Number of the Repeated Rounds
This work aims to study the system dynamics and the behavior of agents in the “long
run.” Samuelson (1998) suggests that the long-run concept that one should be inter-
ested in is some period of time long enough for the process to have converged to a stable
pattern of behavior. It is then necessary to find out the appropriate simulation-run
length z, which satisfies the long-run concept.
In the trial simulations so far, z is always set to 50, and it seems that the evolution
to a stable state can always be observed within the fifty rounds, in which no agent
seeks to leave the current marketplace. Thus, a simulation length of fifty rounds seems
to be long enough to deliver a distinguishable stable pattern for analysis. Therefore,
in the following simulations, the fixed factor z is commonly set to 50.
5.2.2.4 Summery of the Section
As a short summary of the above pre-studies in Sections 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, and 5.2.2.3,
Table 5.10 lists the values of the three fixed factors, which are commonly set in all the
simulations hereinafter.
Fixed factor Value used in simulation
µ 0.5
v¯b 10.0
z 50
Table 5.10: Values of the fixed factors used in the simulation experiment.
5.3 Treatment Design
In this section, the research questions proposed in the first chapter of this work are
converted into simulation settings, so that they can be conducted by computer simu-
lations.
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According to the research questions, the simulation experiments mainly investigate
the influence of the following three aspects on the system dynamics: the population
size, the aggregate seller-buyer ratio, and the listing fee.
The population size refers to the number of all agents in the whole economy. Its
value is the sum of the number of sellers and buyers in both marketplaces. Obviously,
the factor n corresponds to the aspect population. The aggregate seller-buyer ratio is
defined by the number of sellers in both marketplaces divided by the number of buyers
in both marketplaces. The factors s1(MA), b
1(MA), s
1(MB), and b
1(MB) together
implicitly define the aggregate seller-buyer ratio. The listing fee corresponds to the
factors l(MA) and l(MB). For each aspect, the factors could be designated with many
different values. Thus, the combinations of the factors form a huge parameter space.
Figure 5.3 depicts the parameter space used in this work.
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Figure 5.3: The experimental factor space.
According to the parameter space, the simulation experiments are designed accord-
ing to two categories: experiments without listing fees, and experiments with listing
fees. The first category considers the aspect of the population size and the seller-buyer
ratio, and the aspect of the listing fee is added in the latter category of experiments.
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present the treatments in those two categories, respectively.
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5.3.1 Treatments without Listing Fees
In this section, several treatments are designed, with each treatment consisting of sev-
eral simulation settings drawn from the factor space. On the one hand, a setting
investigates a certain combination of the factors. On the other hand, if the simulation
results from different settings or treatments are compared, a comprehensive under-
standing of the simulation over the factor space can be obtained.
5.3.1.1 Treatment A
Treatment A is intended to simulate a small population. It comprises two settings. As
one can easily see, the initial distribution of the agents in setting A1 is the same as
that of the trial simulations. In setting A2, the initial distribution of sellers and buyers
is generated randomly. The random generation method is also applied to determine
the initial distributions in most of the simulation settings afterwards.
The trial experiments in Section 5.2 simulate an economy with twenty agents. This
is a rather small population. Treatment A continues to simulate on this scale with two
simulation settings, as shown in Table 5.11.
Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB)
A1 6 14 2 5 4 9
A2
20
4 16 1 10 3 6
Table 5.11: Simulation settings in Treatment A.
5.3.1.2 Treatments B and C
This subsection introduces two treatments, Treatment B and Treatment C, both of
which are intended to run simulations within a medium-sized population. Three hun-
dred agents are used in both treatments. Tables 5.12 and 5.13 list the simulation
settings in these two treatments, respectively.
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Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB)
B1 29 108 71 92
B2 25 50 75 150
B3
300 100 200
18 96 82 104
B4 7 80 93 120
Table 5.12: Simulation settings in Treatment B.
Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB)
C1 11 20 49 220
C2 35 48 25 192
C3
300 60 240
40 120 20 120
C4 45 80 15 160
Table 5.13: Simulation settings in Treatment C.
These two treatments are designed to study how the simulation dynamics change if
the demand-supply relationship significantly changes. Therefore, the largest difference
between the two treatments is the aggregate seller-buyer ratio. The ratio in every
setting of Treatment B is 0.5, which means that the three hundred agents consist of
one hundred sellers and two hundred buyers. In comparison, the ratio in Treatment C
is only 0.25. For each of these treatments, fours settings are investigated, which differ
in the initial distribution of the agents.
5.3.1.3 Treatments D and E
Compared to Treatment B and Treatment C, Treatments D and E are intended to study
the simulation dynamics within a relatively large population. In both treatments there
are 4500 agents. Similarly, the largest difference between Treatment D and E is also the
aggregate seller-buyer ratio. The ratio in Treatment D is 0.5, while in Treatment E it
is 0.25. Simulations under these two treatments aim to find out whether the simulation
dynamics share some common characteristics with those settings in Treatment B and
Treatment C within a smaller population.
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Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB)
D1 4 447 1496 2553
D2 49 492 1451 2508
D3
4500 1500 3000
364 642 1136 2358
D4 336 1834 1164 1166
Table 5.14: Simulation settings in Treatment D.
Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB)
E1 82 541 818 3059
E2 162 2717 738 883
E3
4500 900 3600
270 857 630 2743
E4 322 2505 578 1095
Table 5.15: Simulation settings in Treatment E.
5.3.1.4 Summary of the Section
To give an overview of the above treatment settings, Figure 5.4 locates the treatments
in the experimental factor space. The domain has only two dimensions, because listing
fees are not considered in these treatments. The population size is segmented into
three levels along the horizontal axis. A simulation setting with twenty agents is used
for the low level; a setting with three hundreds agents is of the middle level; and a
setting with 4500 agents is used for the large population level. Similarly, the axis of
the aggregate seller-buyer ratio is divided into a low ratio part and a high ratio part.
In this study, a setting with an aggregate seller-buyer ratio of 0.25 is classified as a
low ratio, and a ratio of 0.5 is then the high one. Note that the aggregate seller-buyer
ratios are different between the settings in Treatment A, thus Treatment A is located
somewhere between a high ratio and a low ratio.
5.3.2 Treatments with Listing Fees
One of the research questions proposed in the first chapter of this work is about two
marketplaces’ competition with listing fees. So far, the simulation experiments have
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Figure 5.4: Location of the treatments without listing fees in the experimental factor
space.
been considered under the case without listing fees. In this section, several treatments
are designed, so that the dynamics of simulations with listing fees can also be studied.
Basically, there are two cases. One case is that both marketplaces charge the same
listing fee, abbreviated as the symmetric listing fee case. The other case is that the
two marketplaces charge different listing fees, abbreviated as the asymmetric listing
fee case. Sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 introduce the treatments under those two cases,
respectively.
5.3.2.1 Symmetric Listing Fees
A special case of the symmetric listing fee scenario is the case in which both market-
places charge no listing fee. Clearly, simulations under this case should have the same
characteristics with other simulations without listing fees. It is interesting to compare
this scenario with cases in which both marketplaces charge a positive listing fee. Do the
simulation dynamics still share the same characteristics with those under treatments
without listing fees?
Treatment F defines the simulation settings in the symmetric listing fee case, as
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Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB) l(MA) l(MB)
F1(B1) 0.0 0.0
F2 300 100 200 29 108 71 92 3.0 3.0
F3 6.0 6.0
F4(D4) 0.0 0.0
F5 4500 1500 3000 336 1834 1164 1166 3.0 3.0
F6 6.0 6.0
F7(E1) 0.0 0.0
F8 4500 900 3600 82 541 818 3059 3.0 3.0
F9 6.0 6.0
Table 5.16: Simulation settings in Treatment F.
listed in Table 5.16. The treatment contains three groups of settings. Settings F1, F2,
and F3 are in the first group. In setting F1, both marketplaces charge the same listing
fee of zero. This setting is actually the same as setting B1. In setting F2 and F3, the
listing fees charged by the marketplaces are still equal, but the value increases to 3.0 and
6.0 respectively.19 Simulations under these three settings are intended to investigate
whether symmetric listing fees may significantly affect the simulation dynamics.
The remaining two groups of settings are similarly designed. Each group contains
three settings, and the listing fees of the settings within a group increase from 0.0 to
6.0.
It shall be mentioned that the design is intended to facilitate comparisons between
the groups. In the first two groups, the aggregate seller-buyer ratios are both equal
to 0.5. In the latter two groups, the population is set to 4500 agents. Thus, by
comparing the simulation data between two groups, it is feasible to determine whether
the simulation is dependent on a certain aspect (i.e., the population or the aggregate
seller-buyer ratio) or not.
19The highest possible valuation of a buyer is 10.0. Although it is possible to set the listing fees
as high as 10.0, it does not make sense to study this scenario, since no seller could receive a positive
payoff in any of the marketplaces.
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5.3.2.2 Asymmetric Listing Fees
This subsection defines the treatments for the case where the two marketplaces charge
different listing fees. Table 5.17 lists all the treatment settings in this case.
Treatment G corresponds to the case that one marketplace charges a listing fee,
while the other marketplace does not. The initial distribution of agents in Treatment
G is a half-split situation. In setting G1, both marketplaces charge zero listing fees.
Simulations under G1 are intended to show whether the simulation system that starts
from a possible steady state can stay at this state.20
Setting n s b s1(MA) b
1(MA) s
1(MB) b
1(MB) l(MA) l(MB)
G1 0.0 0.0
G2 0.0 3.0
G3
300 100 200 50 100 50 100
0.0 6.0
G4 0.0 8.0
H1 1.0 3.0
H2 1.0 6.0
H3
300 100 200 25 50 75 150
3.0 1.0
H4 6.0 1.0
I1 1.0 3.0
I2 1.0 6.0
I3
4500 1500 3000 364 642 1130 2358
3.0 1.0
I4 6.0 1.0
J1 1.0 3.0
J2 1.0 6.0
J3
4500 900 3600 270 857 630 2743
3.0 1.0
J4 6.0 1.0
Table 5.17: Simulation settings in Treatments G, H, I, and J.
Compared to setting G1, MA still charges no listing fee in setting G2, whereas MB
charges a fee of 3.0. Simulation runs under those two settings need to be compared, to
see whether the listing fee is a factor that independently discriminates the simulation
dynamics or not.
20The trial simulations in Section 5.2 have shown that simulation may evolve to a stable state with
a half-split of buyers and sellers between the marketplaces.
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Treatment H aims to study how the amount of the listing fee influences the sim-
ulation dynamics. In both H1 and H2, the marketplace MA charges a low fee of 1.0,
while MB charges a higher fee. Compared to H1, MB charges a higher fee of 6.0 in H2.
In contrast to H1 and H2, MA charges a higher listing fee than MB in setting H3 and
H4. And the fee charged by MA in H4 is even higher than in H3.
Treatments I and J are designed in a similar way as Treatment H. Now those
treatments under asymmetric listing fees are compared. Treatments G and H share
the same population of 300 agents. The aggregate seller-buyer ratio in Treatments G,
H and I are all 0.5, and in Treatment J the ratio is only 0.25. Treatments I and J share
the same population of 4500 agents. The initial distributions of the agents in those
treatments are also randomly generated. The significant difference between Treatment
H, I, and J is the population. Besides, in both Treatments H and I, the aggregate
seller-buyer ratio is 0.5, while in Treatment J the ratio is only 0.25. In this way, the
treatments are able to cover most of the factor space.
5.4 Summary
This chapter deals with the design of the simulation experiment based on the simulation
model given in Chapter 4. Firstly, the factors and responses are defined in Section 5.1.
The factors consist of fixed factors and experimental factors.
The analysis and design of an experiment can be distinguished but usually cannot
be easily and completely separated. In practice, the analysis of the simulation output
is usually performed after several observations have been obtained, and this is called a
multi-stage approach.
The multi-stage approach is used in this study. In Section 5.2, the simulation
program is run for trials. The trial simulations are used to validate the computer
algorithms which implement the simulation model, as well as to get a first impression
of the simulation dynamics. Section 5.2.2 continues to run trial simulations, in order
to find out the appropriate values of the fixed factors.
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Based on the above work and according to the research questions, a series of sim-
ulation experiments are defined in Section 5.3. Simulation data from each treatment
will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6
Simulation Results and Analysis
This chapter analyzes the simulation data derived from the simulation experiments.
The experiments are conducted according to the treatment settings designed in Chap-
ter 5. Section 6.1 defines the concept of the steady state in this work, and then studies
the dynamics of the system towards a steady state and the dynamics after mutating
from that state. Section 6.2 analyzes the characteristics of the steady states, based on
the simulations without listing fees. Statistical analysis is used to test observations for
significance. In Section 6.3 the simulation experiments conducted with listing fees are
analyzed. This section aims to find out whether the characteristics of the steady states
still hold true in treatments without listing fees, and whether there are new character-
istics in treatments with listing fees. Section 6.4 discusses the simulation results, and
compares the results with those in the related literature. The findings are summarized
at the end of the chapter.
6.1 The Steady State
A problem commonly encountered in simulation systems is that the performance mea-
sures observed during the initial part of a simulation run are different from the long-run
outcomes. It normally takes some time for the effect of the starting conditions to be-
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come insignificant and for the simulation model to stabilize, or to reach the steady
state (Graybeal and Pooch, 1980, p. 145). The analysis of the simulation results under
steady-state conditions is then desirable, since it is normally under these conditions
that the simulated system’s true characteristics are shown.
The presented work aims to investigate the steady-state performance of the simu-
lated system. First of all, it is important to know how to determine whether a steady
state has been achieved. Section 6.1.1 deals with this question.
6.1.1 Determination of the Steady State
The methods of determining the steady state of a simulation are not unique. Kleinjnen
defines a system as being in its steady state if the probability of being in one of its
states is governed by a fixed probability distribution (Kleijnen, 1974, p. 69). Graybeal
and Pooch point out that one of the simplest methods for the determination of the
steady state is to compute a moving average of the performance measure (Graybeal and
Pooch, 1980, p. 145). The steady state is assumed to be reached when the successive
computations of the system state variables no longer vary significantly. In this study,
the method recommended by Graybeal and Pooch is applied.
The trial simulations conducted in Chapter 5 show that the system seems to con-
verge to a stable state by the end of the simulations, in which no agent seeks to move
away from his current marketplace. Based on this observation, in this work, the simu-
lation system is considered to reach a steady state if, from a certain simulation round
onward, the number of sellers and the number of buyers in each marketplace does not
vary, and meanwhile the number of agents’ movements between any two successive
rounds equals zero.
6.1.2 Dynamics Towards the Steady State
Before analyzing the data from many simulation settings, it is illustrative to study the
simulation dynamics under one simulation setting in detail. One simulation run under
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Setting B1 is studied here.
The dynamics of the winning prices and the distribution of agents in the two market-
places are shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 respectively. In both figures, the X-axis
is the simulation round. The Y-axis in Figure 6.1 represents the winning price of the
auctions; in Figure 6.2 the Y-axis stands for the number of agents in a marketplace.
In this simulation there are 100 sellers and 200 buyers, that is, 300 agents in total.
By random designation in the first simulation round, 29 out of 100 sellers and 108 out
of 200 buyers join marketplace A, while the remaining 71 sellers and 92 buyers join
marketplace B. Obviously, MA contains relatively more buyers than MB, and there are
relatively fewer sellers in MA.
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Figure 6.1: Dynamics of the winning prices: one simulation run under Setting B1.
Given this initial distribution, the winning prices of the auctions in the first round
turn out to be p(MA) = 7.582 and p(MB) = 1.531, respectively. Observing these prices,
each agent calculates his real payoff and compares it with his presumed payoff in the
other marketplace. Sellers always prefer the marketplace with the higher price, and
on observing a price difference of 6.051, 14 sellers leave MB and participate in MA in
the second round (R2). Buyers prefer MB because of the lower winning price, and as
a result 49 buyers leave MA and join MB in R
2. These movements trigger significant
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Figure 6.2: Dynamics of the movements of agents: one simulation run under Setting B1.
changes in the demand-offer relationship in the second round — MA now contains 43
sellers and 59 buyers, while 57 sellers and 141 buyers participate in MB.
Consequently, the winning price in MA, which was much higher in MB in the first
round, turns out to be only 3.104 in the second round. In comparison, p(MB) in the
second round is now as high as 5.843. The simulation dynamics show that on the one
hand, agents calculate payoffs according to the prices and then make their decisions;
on the other hand, the agents’ decisions influence the prices.
Now the dynamics of the price difference is analyzed. The price difference in the
first round is 6.051. The movement of agents in the second round leads to the price
difference being reduced to 2.739. As the simulation continues, it can be seen that the
price difference varies within a relative narrow range in the simulation rounds afterward.
The average price difference between the two marketplaces for the remaining 48 rounds
is as small as 0.45.
The movements of agents are also reduced in the meantime. Figure 6.2 shows
that from round R7 onward, the distribution of agents is stable, with MA containing
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40 sellers and 80 buyers while MB contains 60 sellers and 120 buyers. The detailed
simulation data shows that the stableness in the distribution of agents is due to the
number of movements being reduced to zero in these rounds. This means that in these
rounds, each agent chooses to stay in his current marketplace.
Rt st(MA) b
t(MA) s
t(MB) b
t(MB) γ
t(MA) γ
t(MB)
1 29 108 71 92 0.27 0.77
50 40 80 60 120 0.5 0.5
Table 6.1: Distribution of agents at simulation initialization and termination: one
simulation run under Setting B1.
Table 6.1 compares the distribution of agents at simulation initialization and ter-
mination. To see how the distribution has changed, the table includes the seller-buyer
ratios of the two marketplaces. The seller-buyer ratio in MA is given by γ(MA) =
s(MA)/b(MA) and similarly γ(MB) = s(MB)/b(MB).
One can see from Table 6.1 that at the beginning of the simulation, the seller-buyer
ratio in MA is much smaller than in MB. However, at simulation termination the
seller-buyer ratios in the marketplaces equal each other — γ(MA) = γ(MB) = 0.5.
Notice that the aggregate seller-buyer ratio γ (defined in Section 5.3) is also 0.5. Is
this a contingent observation or a typical result?
According to the design of the simulation experiment, the simulation under Setting
B1 is repeated thirty times. It is found that these simulation runs all share similar
dynamics. The price difference between the marketplaces is reduced at the beginning
of the simulation; meanwhile the number of agent movements is reduced, too. As the
simulation continues, the number of agents who leave their current marketplaces and
switch to their rivals’ marketplaces follows the trend of falling, till it decreases to zero
in some round. From that round onward, each agent sticks to his current marketplace,
and the prices vary within a relative small range. In each of the thirty runs, the
simulated system is observed to evolve into a steady state within fifty rounds.
Figure 6.3 displays the distribution of agents at simulation termination in all thirty
simulation runs under Setting B1. The X-axis stands for the number of sellers in a
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marketplace, and the Y-axis stands for the number of buyers in a marketplace. Thus,
the number of sellers and buyers that a marketplace contains can be presented by a
point in the graph. The rectangle points stand for the status of agents’ participance in
MA, while the circular points stand for the status in MB. For convenience, the initial
distribution of agents is also plotted in the graph, but in a larger point size.
It can be easily seen from Figure 6.3 that in the steady states, the number of agents
in the marketplaces differs from run to run. In other words, there are many steady
states with different distributions of agents, rather than a unique steady state with a
deterministic distribution of agents.
Interestingly, the distributions of the agents in the steady states appear to lie along
a line where the seller-buyer ratio is 0.5. This means that the seller-buyer ratios in the
two marketplaces seem to be similar with each other in all the steady states, and their
values are around 0.5, which equals the aggregate seller-buyer ratio. Section 6.2.2 will
analyze this in detail.
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Figure 6.3: Distributions of agents at the end of simulations: thirty simulation runs
under Setting B1.
As a short summary of this subsection, the following observations can be concluded
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from the analysis of the simulation runs under Setting B1.
1. A simulation run under Setting B1 generally evolves into a steady state of market
duopoly, in which no agent seeks to move away from his current marketplace.
2. In the evolution process towards a steady state, the price difference between the
two marketplaces falls; in the steady state, the price difference varies within a
relatively narrow range.
3. The steady state is neither unique nor deterministic. Several simulation runs
under the same setting may evolve into multiple steady states, in which the
distributions of agents are different from each other.
4. In the steady states reached under Setting B1, the seller-buyer ratios in the two
marketplaces are quite close to each other, and close to the aggregate seller-buyer
ratio as well. Reflected in the graph, the distributions of agents in the steady
states appear to lie along a line where the seller-buyer ratio is 0.5.
The above observations are only based on simulation data under Setting B1. In
Section 6.2, simulation data from several other treatment settings will be analyzed, to
see whether the above observations still hold true.
6.1.3 Mutation on Steady State
From the analysis in Section 6.1.2 we know that a simulation run under Setting B1
typically evolves into a stable state of market duopoly, in which every agent with
bounded rationality sticks with his current marketplace. In this section, the “stability”
of the steady state is examined. What happens if some agents become totally irrational,
and select marketplaces contrary to their decisions? More interestingly, what happens
if the mutation of some agents takes place after a steady state is reached? Will the
simulated system evolve into another steady state?
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In order to answer the above questions, it is necessary to study a simulation run
that allows mutation and then compare it with a simulation run without mutation. In
the following, the run without mutation is referred to as the “the original run” and the
run with mutation as the “the mutation run.”
The simulation run under Setting B1, which is studied in detail in Section 6.1.2, is
taken directly as the original run. In order to make a simple comparison, the mutation
run first copies the simulation dynamics from the original run, and then allows mutation
after the steady state has been reached. The mutation is triggered when the system is
in the steady state for ten rounds continuously. Twenty out of three hundred agents are
randomly chosen from the two marketplaces, and they mutate by behaving contrary
to their original decisions.21 The mutation of agents is triggered only once throughout
a simulation run.
Figure 6.4 shows the dynamics of the movements of agents in the mutation run.
The steady state is reached in round R7. Ten rounds afterwards, i.e., in round R16, the
mutation is triggered. Twenty agents are chosen randomly from the marketplaces, and
the detailed simulation data manifest that the twenty agents consist of thirteen sellers
and seven buyers. Nine out of these thirteen sellers have stayed in MA since the steady
state is reached; they mutate and join MB in round R
17. The other four sellers leave
MB and join MA in round R
17. On the buyer side, six out of the seven buyers leave
MA and join MB, while the remaining buyer, who participates in MB in R
16, joins MA
in R17. These mutations lead to a situation where MA contains five less sellers and five
less buyers. Correspondingly, MB contains five more sellers and five more buyers.
Figure 6.4 shows that the distribution of agents appears to be static from round
23 onward, which is the seventh round after the mutation, and the simulated system
seems to have reached another steady state. Now the simulation dynamics between
21It is also possible to study the simulation dynamics within the case where all the agents who
mutate are from the same marketplace. However, such “group mutation” needs some special reasons
in reality, such as a group disclaimer or an organized demonstration. It is not the main focus of the
presented work to include these additional factors.
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Figure 6.4: Dynamics of the movements of agents in the mutation run.
rounds R17 and R23 are analyzed in detail.
Table 6.2 shows the distribution of agents and the winning prices in the rounds
between R16 and R24. The mutation of the twenty agents causes the winning price in
MA to increase from 5.084 to 5.839 in R
17, while in MB the price decreases from 4.839
to 4.431. Compared to R16, the price difference in R17 rises almost tenfold from 0.145
to 1.408. Consequently, one seller switches from MB to MA in round R
18.
The detailed simulation data shows that this seller is one of the agents who mutates
and switches from MA to MB in R
17. However, due to the changes of the prices after
the mutation, the seller prefers to switch back to MA in round R
18. The other sellers,
who also participate in MB in R
17, prefer to switch to MA in R
18, too. However, it
turns out that only this seller switches in R18. Two reasons jointly account for this.
One is that the probability of moving for most of the sellers in MB in R
17 is not
as high as with this seller. The discount factor of this seller increases because of
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Rt st(MA) b
t(MA) s
t(MB) b
t(MB) p
t(MA) p
t(MB)
16 40 80 60 120 5.084 4.839
17 35 75 65 125 5.839 4.431
18 36 75 64 125 5.573 5.124
19 36 75 64 125 4.955 5.084
20 36 75 64 125 5.341 4.657
21 36 75 64 125 5.089 4.929
22 36 75 64 125 3.793 4.955
23 36 76 64 124 5.365 4.929
24 36 76 64 124 4.559 5.084
Table 6.2: Simulation dynamics between R16 and R25 in the mutation run.
the mutation,22 while most of the sellers in MB never mutate. Therefore, the price
difference of 1.408 in R17 is less discounted by this seller than by most of the other
sellers, and consequently this seller has a relative higher probability of moving.
There are eight sellers who mutate together with this seller and join MB in R
17.
The probabilities of moving by these sellers are relatively higher than with most of the
sellers who never mutate. However, they may be not so “lucky” in drawing a decision
based on their probabilities of moving — as a result, they all decide to stay.
From round R18 till round R22, the distribution of agents is rather stable. The price
difference varies in a narrow range between R18 and R22, with a mean value of 0.356 and
a standard deviation of 0.206. However, the price difference jumps up to 1.162 in round
R22. According to the simulation model, buyers’ valuations are randomly generated in
each round. Therefore, it is possible that in a round a larger price difference occurs.
Due to the changes of the prices in R22, the simulation data shows that several
buyers prefer to switch to MA in R
23. Similar to the seller side, the buyers who mutate
and join MA in R
17 are relatively more sensitive to the larger price difference, compared
to other buyers who never mutate. After computing the probabilities of moving and
drawing a decision according to the probabilities, it turns out that one buyer switched
back to MA in round R
23.
22To see why the switch of an agent increases his discount factor, refer to Section 4.7.2.2 in Chapter 4.
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From round R23 till the end of the mutation run, the distribution of the agents
remains the same. Thus, the simulation has evolved into another steady state, in
which 36 sellers and 76 buyers participate in MA, while 64 sellers and 124 buyers join
MB.
The above analysis manifests that the simulated system is able to sustain the mu-
tation of a small proportion of agents, and can quickly converge to another steady
state. In the evolution towards a new steady state, it is observed that the agents who
have mutated are more sensitive to the variations of the prices. The agents who never
mutate have stayed in their current marketplaces for a long enough time, therefore
they do not necessarily react to the mutation of other agents.
6.2 Results of the Treatments without Listing Fees
The observations in Section 6.1.2 show the existence of steady states. In this sec-
tion, the general existence of steady states is examined by simulations under multiple
heterogeneous treatment settings, in which listing fees are not considered.
At the same time, this section studies the characteristics of the steady state, when-
ever it is observed. The analysis focuses on the following three issues in the steady
state: a) the average price difference between the marketplaces; b) the seller-buyer
ratios in the marketplaces; and c) the distribution of agents.
6.2.1 The Price Difference
The simulations under Setting B1 show that the price difference between the market-
places follows a trend of decreasing in the dynamics toward a steady state. In the steady
state, since the changes of the prices caused by the movements of agents have been
eliminated, the prices vary only due to the randomly generated buyers’ valuations. The
price difference between the marketplaces is therefore relatively small, and seems to
vary only within a small range during the steady state. This section examines whether
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the above observations hold true statistically, and whether they are independent of the
setting used.
The thirty simulation runs under the Setting B1 are examined first. For each run,
the price differences between the marketplaces in each round are calculated. Take the
simulation rounds, during which the system is in the steady state. The average of the
price differences in those rounds is defined as the average price difference during the
steady state (denoted by ∆˜p). In contrast, the average price difference before the steady
state (denoted by ∆˙p) is the average from the first round till the round in which the
steady state is reached.
Run ∆˙p ∆˜p Run ∆˙p ∆˜p
1 1.261 0.408 16 1.565 0.555
2 1.478 0.511 17 1.175 0.523
3 1.332 0.429 18 1.265 0.448
4 1.121 0.559 19 1.530 0.456
5 0.994 0.398 20 1.481 0.436
6 1.842 0.541 21 1.422 0.459
7 1.224 0.554 22 1.286 0.416
8 1.340 0.61 23 1.261 0.619
9 1.365 0.528 24 0.971 0.555
10 0.964 0.539 25 1.761 0.639
11 1.521 0.491 26 1.018 0.529
12 0.996 0.327 27 1.791 0.537
13 1.483 0.495 28 1.626 0.515
14 1.408 0.41 29 1.247 0.386
15 1.020 0.393 30 1.138 0.382
Table 6.3: Average price difference before and during the steady state: thirty simulation
runs under Setting B1.
For the thirty runs under Setting B1, there are thirty ∆˙ps and thirty ∆˜ps corre-
spondingly, as listed in Table 6.3. One can see that for each run ∆˙p is larger than
∆˜p, and the value of ∆˜p seems to be always around 0.5 in those runs. Statistical mea-
surements further show that the mean value of those ∆˜ps is 0.488 and the standard
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deviation is only 0.078 (see Table 6.4).23 This confirms that the average price difference
is small and varies only within a small range during the steady state under Setting B1.
Similar analysis has been conducted for all the other settings in Treatments B,
C, D, and E. For each setting, the values of ∆˜p in all the thirty simulation runs are
calculated and listed in a table; the corresponding tables are shown in Appendix B. To
give an overview, Table 6.4 gives the statistics on ∆˜p in those treatment settings.
In all four settings of Treatment B, the mean values of ∆˜p lie around 0.5, and the
deviations are not more than 0.138. This means that given a population of 100 sellers
and 200 buyers, a small ∆˜p is always observable in the steady state, independently of
the initial distribution of these sellers and buyers.
Such small ∆˜ps can also be observed for all simulations under settings in Treatment
C. Note that the aggregate seller-buyer ratio in Treatment B is 0.5 while in Treatment
C it is only 0.25. Similarly, Treatments D and E are different to each other also in the
aggregate seller-buyer ratio, but the ∆˜ps in both settings are always around 0.2. This
shows that ∆˜p is generally small, independent of the aggregate seller-buyer ratio.
Furthermore, the mean value of ∆˜p is larger in Treatments B and C (in which there
are 300 agents) than in Treatments D and E (in which 4500 agents are simulated). The
reason for this will be given later in Section 6.2.2, since it would be more explicit to
be explained after the characteristic of the seller-buyer ratios in the steady states is
studied.
6.2.2 The Seller-buyer Ratios
The simulation runs studied in Section 6.1.2 show that in the steady state the seller-
buyer ratios seem to be quite close to each other, and are close to the aggregate seller-
buyer ratio as well. In this subsection, more simulations conducted under different
23In the presented work, all the statistical measurements are obtained by us-
ing the scientific computing and analysis software OriginPro 7.5. Refer to
http://www.originlab.com/www/helponline/orgin/Origin Reference Version 75.htm for more details
about the statistical techniques used in the measurements.
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Average price difference during the steady state (∆˜p)
Setting
Min Max Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
B1 0.327 0.639 0.488 0.078 [0.382, 0.619]
B2 0.357 0.974 0.537 0.138 [0.359, 0.779]
B3 0.372 0.726 0.486 0.082 [0.376, 0.667]
B4 0.304 0.744 0.486 0.102 [0.354, 0.715]
C1 0.401 0.766 0.562 0.089 [0.441, 0.730]
C2 0.291 0.668 0.496 0.097 [0.366, 0.655]
C3 0.334 0.630 0.495 0.073 [0.355, 0.622]
C4 0.298 0.858 0.522 0.134 [0.329, 0.845]
D1 0.116 0.543 0.294 0.124 [0.136, 0.507]
D2 0.124 0.467 0.247 0.090 [0.126, 0.432]
D3 0.078 0.247 0.130 0.037 [0.089, 0.238]
D4 0.074 0.207 0.110 0.029 [0.076, 0.183]
E1 0.132 0.408 0.216 0.065 [0.132, 0.323]
E2 0.103 0.284 0.168 0.042 [0.119, 0.237]
E3 0.108 0.261 0.170 0.039 [0.127, 0.256]
E4 0.080 0.319 0.184 0.054 [0.132, 0.283]
Table 6.4: Statistics on the average price difference during the steady state: simula-
tions under Treatments B, C, D, and E.
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settings are analyzed, in order to see whether this is a contingent observation or a
typical characteristic.
Ratio Min Max Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
γ(MA) 0.4375 0.5361 0.4944 0.0227 [0.4588,0.5250]
γ(MB) 0.4660 0.5577 0.5048 0.0189 [0.4779,0.5321]
Table 6.5: Statistics on the seller-buyer ratios in the steady states: simulations under
Setting B1.
Again, the thirty simulation runs conducted under Setting B1 are examined first.
For each run, the seller-buyer ratios of the marketplaces (γ(MA) and γ(MB)) in the
steady state are calculated. Table 6.5 gives the statistical properties of these two
ratios. The mean value of γ(MA) out of the thirty runs is 0.4944, with a standard
deviation as small as 0.0227. Similarly, the seller-buyer ratio in MB has a mean value
of 0.5048, with a standard deviation of 0.0189. The difference between 0.5 and the
mean of γ(MA) is 0.0056, and the difference is 0.0048 between 0.5 and γ(MB). The
90% percentile confidence interval of γ(MA) lies in [0.4588, 0.5250], and for γ(MB) it
lies in [0.4779, 0.5321]. Given these statistical values, it is reasonable to argue that the
two ratios are both close to 0.5, and at the mean time similar to each other.
Table 6.6 lists the statistical measurements of the simulations under Treatment B
and D. Simulations under these two settings have the same aggregate seller-buyer ratio
of 0.5. One can see that under Treatment B, the mean values of the two ratios are
always close to 0.5, and the largest standard deviation is only 0.0343. For simulations
under Treatment D, the mean values of the two ratios are also close to 0.5. The
aggregate seller-buyer ratio in Treatments C and E is 0.25, and the mean values of
γ(MA) and γ(MB) in these two treatments are observed to be both close to 0.25, too
(see Table 6.7).
Further, the statistic values between the treatments are compared. Table 6.6 and
Table 6.7 show that the standard deviations under Treatment D are generally smaller
than those under Treatment B, and those under Treatment E are generally smaller
than those under Treatment C.
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Setting Ratio Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
γ(MA) 0.4944 0.0227 [0.4588, 0.5250]B1
γ(MB) 0.5048 0.0189 [0.4779, 0.5321]
γ(MA) 0.4843 0.0343 [0.4238, 0.5469]B2
γ(MB) 0.5067 0.0143 [0.4834, 0.5320]
γ(MA) 0.5018 0.0224 [0.4605, 0.5385]B3
γ(MB) 0.4993 0.0142 [0.4797, 0.5242]
γ(MA) 0.4867 0.0229 [0.4429, 0.5156]B4
γ(MB) 0.5079 0.0143 [0.4921, 0.5349]
γ(MA) 0.4685 0.0153 [0.4435, 0.4921]D1
γ(MB) 0.5097 0.0047 [0.5024, 0.5175]
γ(MA) 0.4742 0.0108 [0.4508, 0.4893]D2
γ(MB) 0.5080 0.0035 [0.5033, 0.5153]
γ(MA) 0.5004 0.0089 [0.4885, 0.5183]D3
γ(MB) 0.4999 0.0033 [0.4931, 0.5044]
γ(MA) 0.4979 0.0049 [0.4908, 0.5054]D4
γ(MB) 0.5019 0.0043 [0.4953, 0.5076]
Table 6.6: Statistics on the seller-buyer ratios in the steady states: simulations under
Treatments B and D.
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This is due to the different population sizes used in the simulations. The movement
of a single agent can lead to greater changes in the prices and in the seller-buyer ratios
in a smaller population than in a larger population. Therefore, it may happen in the
case of a small population size that an agent switches due to a price difference, but
this movement leads to an even larger price difference. Large populations, on the other
hand, are robust to these effects. The movement of an agent in a larger population
is more likely to “fine tune” the price difference as well as the difference between the
seller-buyer ratios down to a lower level than in a smaller population. This also explains
why the average price difference in the steady states is relatively lower in Treatment
D and E (with 4500 agents) than in Treatment B and C (with 300 agents).
Setting Ratio Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
γ(MA) 0.2309 0.0270 [0.1818, 0.2766]C1
γ(MB) 0.2577 0.0099 [0.2432, 0.2759]
γ(MA) 0.2478 0.0146 [0.2222, 0.2736]C2
γ(MB) 0.2517 0.0126 [0.2313, 0.2783]
γ(MA) 0.2563 0.0150 [0.2345, 0.2910]C3
γ(MB) 0.2421 0.0198 [0.2000, 0.2727]
γ(MA) 0.2626 0.0173 [0.2326, 0.2910]C4
γ(MB) 0.2349 0.0202 [0.1981, 0.2703]
γ(MA) 0.2530 0.0105 [0.2356, 0.2757]E1
γ(MB) 0.2495 0.0019 [0.2456, 0.2525]
γ(MA) 0.2504 0.0041 [0.2413, 0.2591]E2
γ(MB) 0.2496 0.0037 [0.2419, 0.2575]
γ(MA) 0.2540 0.0057 [0.2468, 0.2652]E3
γ(MB) 0.2483 0.0024 [0.2436, 0.2514]
γ(MA) 0.2455 0.0037 [0.2389, 0.2512]E4
γ(MB) 0.2546 0.0037 [0.2487, 0.2612]
Table 6.7: Statistics on the seller-buyer ratios in the steady states: simulations un-
der Treatments C and E.
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6.2.3 The Distribution of Agents
The analysis in Section 6.2.2 shows that the seller-buyer ratios of the marketplaces
are generally similar to each other in the steady states. If displayed in a graph, the
distributions of the agents under the same Setting B1 seem to form a straight line in
the steady states rather than randomly scattering (see Figure 6.3, for example).
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Figure 6.5: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treatment B.
In this section, the distribution of agents in more simulations under different settings
is examined. The objective of the analysis is to find out a) whether a broad range
of possible distributions along a straight line is a general result; and b) what the
relationship is between the number of sellers and the number of buyers.
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Figure 6.5 depicts the distribution of agents in the four settings of Treatment B.
Although the thirty simulation runs under each setting all start from the same initial
distribution, the distributions of agents always lie across a broad range in the steady
states. Moreover, the range of the distribution of agents is different from setting to
setting. This is because the distributions of agents already differ from one another at
simulation initialization. Besides, the distributions under Setting B2 appear special
in comparison with the other three settings, in that the distributions of agents in the
steady states are quite similar to the initial distribution. This is because the demand-
offer relationship is already in a balance status at the beginning of the simulations. This
makes the winning prices in the marketplaces already close to each other at simulation
initialization; thus not many agents are motivated to move. Consequently, a simulation
ends with a similar distribution.
The broad range of the distributions of agents in the steady states, as observed under
Treatment B, can also be observed under Treatments C, D, and E. Figures 6.6, 6.7,
and 6.8 display the distributions of agents under these three treatments, respectively.
These figures also give an impression that for a marketplace in a steady state, the
more sellers there are, the more buyers there are, and vice versa. Recall that the seller-
buyer ratios of the marketplaces are similar to each other. It is then expected that the
correlation between the number of sellers and the number of buyers in the steady states
is strong. Note that there are only two marketplaces available for agents to switch,
and that the total number of sellers the total number of buyers are both constants in
a simulation run. Thus, the correlation between the number of sellers and the number
of buyers in one marketplace must equal the correlation in the other marketplace.
Therefore, it is enough to calculate the correlation in one of the marketplaces.
In this study, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is used to measure the correlation.
Table 6.8 lists the values of the correlation coefficient of simulations under settings in
Treatments B, C, D, and E. One can see that in all these settings, the coefficient is
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(a) Thirty simulation runs under Setting C1
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(b) Thirty simulation runs under Setting C2
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting C3
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(d) Thirty simulation runs under Setting C4
Figure 6.6: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treatment C.
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(a) Thirty simulation runs under Setting D1
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(b) Thirty simulation runs under Setting D2
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting D3
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(d) Thirty simulation runs under Setting D4
Figure 6.7: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treatment D.
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(a) Thirty simulation runs under Setting E1
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(b) Thirty simulation runs under Setting E2
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting E3
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Figure 6.8: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treatment E.
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Setting Pearson’s correlation coefficient
B1 0.751
B2 0.618
B3 0.780
B4 0.794
C1 0.781
C2 0.715
C3 0.637
C4 0.770
D1 0.680
D2 0.866
D3 0.826
D4 0.881
E1 0.643
E2 0.656
E3 0.674
E4 0.717
Table 6.8: Pearson’s correlation coefficient in simulations under Treatments B, C, D,
and E.
always higher than 0.6.24
Correlation Negative Positive
Small -0.3 to -0.1 0.1 to 0.3
Medium -0.5 to -0.3 0.3 to 0.5
Large -0.5 to 1.0 0.5 to 1.0
Table 6.9: Interpretation of correlations in social science research.
The interpretation of the correlation coefficient depends on the context and purpose.
Cohen suggests an interpretation for correlations in social science research, as shown
in Table 6.9 (Cohen, 1988). According to the table, the correlation coefficient is large
in the simulations. This indicates that the strength of a linear relationship between
the number of sellers and the number of buyers in a marketplace is strong.25
24What is worth mentioning is that the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient alone may not
be sufficient to evaluate this relationship, especially in the case where the assumption of normality is
incorrect. Therefore, the correlation coefficient, as a summary statistic, cannot replace the individual
examination of the data.
25One may argue that numerical simulations are different from social science researches such as
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6.2.4 A Special Case: Small Population
So far, the analysis has focused on the medium and the large population. This section
analyzes the simulations within a small population of only twenty agents (i.e., under
Treatment A). As one will later see, the characteristics of the steady states under
Treatment A are not similar to those within the medium and the large population, and
the main reason is the size of the population.
Run ∆˙p ∆˜p Run ∆˙p ∆˜p
1 1.799 3.397 16 2.258 2.1
2 3.279 2.281 17 1.65 2.042
3 4.014 2.374 18 2.742 2.194
4 3.264 1.806 19 6.96 3.349
5 3.609 1.94 20 2.34 2.064
6 3.09 4.366 21 2.933 1.621
7 2.913 2.029 22 0.316 1.95
8 2.656 1.734 23 1.546 2.219
9 1.672 1.566 24 2.488 2.663
10 4.521 1.588 25 3.21 2.112
11 3.233 2.513 26 1.99 2.328
12 3.697 2.419 27 2.409 1.768
13 3.2 3.302 28 4.135 2.457
14 2.609 2.703 29 2.181 2.02
15 1.133 2.148 30 3.579 4.59
Table 6.10: Average price difference before and during the steady state: thirty simula-
tion runs under Setting A1.
Firstly, the aspect of the price difference is examined. For the thirty simulation
runs under A1, Table 6.10 gives the average price difference before and during the
steady states. In 11 out of 30 runs (i.e., 36.7% of all runs), ∆˙p is smaller than ∆˜p.
This indicates that the price difference between the marketplaces does not significantly
drop when the system reaches a steady state. In comparison, the values of ∆˙p are
always larger than ∆˜ps in the simulations under Treatments B, C, D, and E (see
psychological studies, and a larger correlation might be necessary to claim a strong linear relationship.
Clearly, there is no strict standard about this, and Cohen’s suggest is presented here as a reference.
6.2 Results of the Treatments without Listing Fees 101
Table 6.3, for example).
The statistical properties of the ∆˜ps are calculated for the simulations under both
settings in Treatment A, and are listed in Table 6.11. Compared to the statistical
measurements under Treatment B, C, D and E (see Tables 6.11 and 6.4), the mean
value and the standard deviation of ∆˜ps are significantly greater.
Average price difference during the steady state (∆˜p)
Setting
Min Max Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
A1 1.566 4.590 2.388 0.742 [1.588, 4.366]
A2 1.316 3.508 1.857 0.458 [1.408, 2.950]
Table 6.11: Statistics on the average price difference during the steady state: simula-
tions under Treatment A.
Secondly, the distributions of agents in the steady states under A1 and A2 are
examined. One can see from Figure 6.9 that under neither of the settings does the
distribution of agents appear to lie along a straight line, which indicates the aggregate
seller-buyer ratio. Rather, the distributions are spread wildly across the graph.
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Figure 6.9: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treatment A.
This is because the above observations are obtained with a very limited number
of agents in the simulation. In a marketplace that contains a small population, the
6.2 Results of the Treatments without Listing Fees 102
difference between the k − th and the (k + 1)− th highest valuations of the buyers is
generally greater than that in a marketplace with a larger population. Moreover, the
movement of a single agent in a smaller population may lead to a larger variance in
the prices than in a larger one, given that the other agents do not move. In a word,
both the price difference and the variance of the prices tend to be greater in a small
population. It is then easy to understand why both the mean value and the standard
deviation of the price difference are significantly greater in simulations with twenty
agents than that with 300 agents or 4500 agents.
The above analysis also explains the wide spread of the distribution of agents within
the small population. The endogenous principle of the agents’ decision-making is that
the winning price in a marketplace indicates the demand-offer relationship in that
marketplace. However, if a marketplace contains only a few agents, the connection
between the price and the demand-offer situation is weakened.
To see this, consider a marketplace with only one seller and two buyers. Clearly, the
winning price is the lowest valuation of the buyers. Assume that the price is 2.5 in a
simulation round. Then assume that the valuations of the buyers turn out to be 4.3 and
6.0 respectively in the next round. Now the price is 4.3, which is significantly higher
than in the former round. However, this is not necessarily related to more demands or
fewer offers in the marketplace, but rather to the higher variance of the winning bids.
From the above example, one can see that the decision-making of agents may work
less accurately in payoff maximization, when the population size in the economy is very
small. It is then not surprising to see that even though the simulations still evolve into
steady states, the distributions of agents are actually erratic.
6.2.5 Summary of the Section
As a short summary of Section 6.2, the following observations are concluded.
1. Simulations under treatments without listing fees generally converge to steady
states of market duopoly, in which all agents always stick to their current marketplaces.
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2. Although the simulations converge to many steady states with different distri-
butions of agents, they share several common characteristics, which include:
a) the winning prices of the two marketplaces vary in a narrow range during the
steady states, and the difference between the prices are small.
b) the seller-buyer ratios of the two marketplaces are both close to the aggregate
seller-buyer ratio;
c) a strong linear relationship between the number of sellers and the number of
buyers in a marketplace exists;
3. However, the above characteristics do not necessarily hold true, in the steady
states observed within a small population size (such as twenty agents). This is because
both the discrepancy between the buyers’ valuations and the variance of the valuations
tend to be larger in a small population, which leads to (to some extent) erratic decision-
makings by agents in payoff maximization.
6.3 Results of the Treatments with Listing Fees
According to the design of the simulation experiment in Section 5.3.2, the simulations
including listing fees are conducted under two cases: the symmetric case and the
asymmetric case. This section analyzes these two cases.
6.3.1 Symmetric Listing Fees
The analysis starts with the simulation data under Settings F1, F2, and F3. In each of
these three settings, the two marketplaces charge the same listing fee, but the amount
of the listing fee varies from setting to setting. Note that the amount in Setting F1 is
zero, which makes Setting F1 actually identical to Setting B1.
The detailed simulation data shows that steady states are observed in all the sim-
ulations under the above three settings. Figure 6.10 depicts the distribution of agents
in the steady state under those three settings respectively. The figure shows that the
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Figure 6.10: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Settings F1,
F2, and F3.
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distributions under Settings F1 and F2 are widely spread and appear to lie along the
line that presents a seller-buyer ratio of 0.5 — these characteristics appears to be quite
similar to those in simulations without listing fees.
Setting Ratio Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
γ(MA) 0.4944 0.0227 [0.4588, 0.5250]F1
γ(MB) 0.5048 0.0189 [0.4779, 0.5321]
γ(MA) 0.5031 0.0244 [0.4647, 0.5490]F2
γ(MB) 0.4967 0.0230 [0.4510, 0.5346]
Table 6.12: Statistics on the seller-buyer ratios in the steady states: simulations under
Settings F1 and F2.
In order to confirm this impression, the statistical properties of the seller-buyer
ratios are calculated, as listed in Table 6.12. Moreover, Table 6.13 gives the values of
the correlation coefficient in these two settings. It is clear that no significant difference
is observed between the two settings and the settings under Treatment B, in which
listing fees are not included.
Setting Pearson’s correlation coefficient
F1 0.751
F2 0.811
Table 6.13: Pearson’s correlation coefficient of simulations under Settings F1 and F2.
Further, the aspect of the price difference is analyzed. Table 6.14 lists the average
price differences for each run under F2.26 Moreover, Table 6.15 gives the statistical
properties of the ∆˜ps in both settings. Not surprisingly, the average price differences
in the steady states are always small under both settings. Although the standard
deviation under F2 is larger than in F1, it is not significantly larger, if compared to
that under other settings such as B2 and B4.
Compared to the distributions of the agents under F1 and F2, the distributions
under F3 appear obviously different. To investigate the details, one simulation run is
26See Table 6.3 for the average price differences under Setting F1.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.561 11 0.673 21 0.498
2 0.46 12 0.519 22 0.428
3 0.448 13 0.446 23 0.346
4 0.673 14 0.656 24 0.78
5 0.861 15 0.596 25 0.558
6 0.49 16 0.564 26 0.386
7 0.527 17 0.368 27 0.548
8 0.59 18 0.728 28 0.384
9 0.393 19 0.432 29 0.428
10 0.339 20 0.589 30 0.338
Table 6.14: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting F2.
Average price difference during the steady state (∆˜p)
Setting
Min Max Mean StDev 90% confidence interval
F1 0.327 0.639 0.488 0.078 [0.382, 0.619]
F2 0.338 0.861 0.520 0.135 [0.339, 0.780]
Table 6.15: Statistics on the average price differences in the steady states under Set-
tings F1 and F2.
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randomly selected out of the thirty runs under F3 and analyzed.
Table 6.16 shows the dynamics of the distribution of agents as well as the dynamics
of the winning prices in all fifty rounds. The number of sellers has not changed in
either of the marketplaces throughout the simulation run. The detailed simulation
data shows that there is no switch by any seller.
The reason for this is that the listing fee, which is 6.0 in both marketplaces in
Setting F3, is too high. Note that the winning prices in both marketplaces are often
between 4.0 to 6.0. Thus, no matter which marketplace a seller participates in, his
real and presumed payoff, according to the simulation model, is often as low as zero.
In other words, neither marketplace is able to realize a positive payoff for the sellers,
simply because the listing fees for both are too high. Therefore, sellers passively stay in
their original marketplaces. The same behavior of sellers can be observed for all thirty
simulation runs under F3, the details of which are omitted due to space limitation.
On the buyers’ side, the payoffs are not directly determined by the listing fees, but
they may switch due to the variations of payoffs, which are influenced by the listing
fees. Since the number of the items being offered is “fixed” in each marketplace because
of the sellers behavior, it is easy to understand that the buyers’ movements quickly
balance the demand-offer relationship, and the simulation soon converges to a steady
state.
It is noteworthy to mention that the random generation of buyer’s valuations in each
simulation round makes the prices vary despite there being no change in demand or
offer. Thus, the decisions of buyers are not exactly the same in different simulation runs,
although the sellers always passively stay in their current marketplaces. This explains
why the distributions of buyers in the thirty simulation runs are slightly different from
each other, while the distributions of sellers are the same. Reflected in the graph, the
distributions of agents in the two marketplaces form two vertical lines, as shown in
Figure 6.10c.
This part of the analysis shows that when both marketplaces charge equal listing
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Rt st(MA) b
t(MA) s
t(MB) b
t(MB) p
t(MA) p
t(MB)
1 29 108 71 92 6.695 1.783
2 29 63 71 137 5.431 4.693
3 29 58 71 142 5.124 4.693
4 29 55 71 145 4.402 5.154
5 29 58 71 142 5.626 5.124
6 29 56 71 144 5.431 5.551
7 29 56 71 144 4.693 5.325
8 29 56 71 144 4.657 4.955
9 29 56 71 144 4.955 5.124
10 29 56 71 144 4.955 5.084
11 29 56 71 144 5.124 4.339
12 29 56 71 144 5.124 4.693
13 29 56 71 144 4.657 5.365
14 29 56 71 144 3.38 5.573
15 29 56 71 144 4.929 5.325
16 29 56 71 144 4.693 5.084
17 29 56 71 144 5.843 4.955
18 29 56 71 144 4.929 5.084
19 29 56 71 144 4.929 5.325
20 29 56 71 144 5.573 4.693
21 29 56 71 144 5.573 5.154
22 29 56 71 144 4.339 5.831
23 29 56 71 144 4.339 5.084
24 29 56 71 144 3.078 5.124
25 29 56 71 144 4.839 5.365
26 29 56 71 144 4.693 5.084
27 29 56 71 144 5.325 5.124
28 29 56 71 144 5.124 4.929
29 29 56 71 144 3.38 4.929
30 29 56 71 144 5.365 4.839
31 29 56 71 144 4.839 5.124
32 29 56 71 144 5.084 5.084
33 29 56 71 144 5.573 5.154
34 29 56 71 144 5.998 5.084
35 29 56 71 144 4.402 4.929
36 29 56 71 144 3.104 5.084
37 29 56 71 144 5.958 5.626
38 29 56 71 144 4.657 4.431
39 29 56 71 144 4.955 4.955
40 29 56 71 144 4.955 4.929
41 29 56 71 144 5.084 5.341
42 29 56 71 144 4.929 4.693
43 29 56 71 144 4.657 5.325
44 29 56 71 144 4.955 5.124
45 29 56 71 144 4.929 4.955
46 29 56 71 144 4.657 5.084
47 29 56 71 144 5.341 4.929
48 29 56 71 144 4.559 4.839
49 29 56 71 144 4.339 4.657
50 29 56 71 144 4.431 4.955
Table 6.16: Dynamics of the prices and the distribution of agents: one simulation run
under Setting F3.
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fees, a steady-state duopoly still exists, and the value of a listing fee does not sig-
nificantly affect the distribution of agents by the stable-state duopoly. Only, if both
marketplaces charge the same but very high listing fees, sellers do not switch because
it is not possible to pursue a higher payoff in either of the marketplaces.
6.3.2 Asymmetric Listing Fees
It has been shown that without listing fees, the simulation generally evolves into a
steady state of duopoly. This result also applies when both marketplaces charge the
same listing fee, which is not too high. Simulations in this section aim to find out
whether the above results still hold true with asymmetric listing fee settings; and if
yes, how and to what extent the listing fee influences the distribution of agents in the
steady state.
6.3.2.1 Simulations under Treatment G
In Treatment G, simulations start from a “half-split” state, in which an equal number
of sellers and buyers participate in each marketplace. In Setting G1, both marketplaces
charge zero listing fees. Thus, it is expected to see only small price differences between
the marketplaces, and to see only few movements of agents. As one can see from
Figure 6.13a, the distributions of agents in the steady states are very similar to the
distribution in the initial state of the simulations — this is consistent with the above
expectation.
In the other three settings in Treatment G, MA always charges a zero listing fee,
while the listing fee in MB is set as 3.0, 6.0, and 8.0, respectively. Thus, if significantly
different observations are obtained by comparing the simulation data under those set-
tings with those under G1, it should be due to the difference in the amount of the
listing fees.
Figure 6.13b shows that in the steady states that have been reached under Setting
G2, MB contains around 35 sellers and 75 buyers, and both numbers are lower than
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting F6
Figure 6.11: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Settings F4,
F5, and F6.
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting F9
Figure 6.12: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Settings F7,
F8, and F9.
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(d) Thirty simulation runs under Setting G4
Figure 6.13: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treat-
ment G.
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those in the initial state. Correspondingly, MA contains more sellers and buyers. Fig-
ure 6.14 gives the simulation dynamics of one simulation run, which is typical among
all thirty runs under G2. In the early period of the simulation, a few sellers switched
from MB to MA due to a lower listing fee in MA. The relatively lower amount of sellers
in MB naturally led to a higher price, and consequently some buyers in MB to switch
to MA. Thus, when the simulation evolves into a steady state, the marketplace MB,
which charges a higher listing fee, loses both a few sellers and a few buyers. Similar ob-
servations are also obtained in simulations under Settings G3 and G4 (see Figures 6.13c
and 6.13d), in that MA is always able to attract some sellers as well as some buyers
from MB.
Comparing the distributions of agents between the settings in Treatment G, one
can see that the higher the listing fee in MB is, the more buyers and sellers leave MB.
Despite this, simulations under Settings G2 and G3 still converge to steady states of
market duopoly. However, when MB charges a listing fee as high as 8.0 (as in Setting
G4), Figure 6.13d shows that in some of the runs, MA is able to attract all the sellers
in the steady states. In the following, one of the simulation runs under Setting G4 is
analyzed in detail.
Table 6.17 shows the dynamics of the prices and the distribution of agents in this
simulation run. The very high listing fee of 8.0 in MB leads to zero-payoffs of all sellers
in this marketplace in the first round. As a result, all sellers in MB switch to MA in
the second round. This makes the price in MB jump up to 9.929,
27 while in MA the
price decreases to zero because the number of sellers exceeds the number of buyers. In
such a situation, MB seems to be more profitable than MA, despite the high listing fee.
Therefore, 37 sellers switch from MA back to MB in round R
3.
However, thirty-seven sellers are too many to keep the sellers in MB still profitable.
As a result, these sellers all switch back to MA in round R
4 and stay in MA for the
27According to the simulation model, the winning price is the highest rejected bid. If there is no
seller but some buyers, the price is simply the highest bid from the buyers, although no transaction
actually takes place.
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Figure 6.14: Dynamics of one simulation run under Setting G2.
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remaining rounds. In several other simulation runs under Setting G4, MB attracts
some sellers in the steady states (see Figure 6.13d), but the number of the sellers is
very small. This shows that MB can “afford” only several sellers in making them
profitable despite the high listing fee.
On the buyers’ side, Table 6.17 shows that the number of buyers in MB follows a
trend of decreasing, until the simulated system converges to a steady state. Since there
is no seller in MB, which leads to a very high price in MB, buyers in MB gradually
switch to MA, too.
However, not all the buyers in MB choose to switch to MA, and fifty-eight buyers
still stay in MBs during the steady state. This reflects the influence of path dependency.
According to the simulation model, a decision to “stay” is made under two cases. In
the first case, an agent prefers to switch to the other marketplace. However, due to
bounded rationality there is only a probability that he might move, and it turns out
the decision is to stay. In the second case, a buyer’s valuation is lower than both of the
prices in the marketplace. The buyer receives a payoff of zero in both marketplaces, and
thus does not prefer to switch. No matter which of the cases holds, the decision is the
same. Therefore, it is possible that a buyer chooses to stay in his current marketplace
successively in the early period of a simulation run. This leads to the payoff difference
having less influence on the buyer’s decisions, and the time is so long that he rather
“ignores” the payoff difference, and simply sticks to the current marketplace in the
remaining simulation rounds.
As a short summary of Section 6.3.2.1, simulations under Treatment G show that
the simulation system may converge to steady states of market duopoly, in the case
where the two marketplaces charge different listing fees. In such a steady state, the
marketplace that charges a lower listing fee attracts both a few sellers and a few buyers
from the other marketplace with a higher listing fee. Meanwhile, the latter one does
not lose all its participants and still attracts some sellers and buyers. However, such a
steady state of market duopoly cannot be observed, if one of the marketplaces charges
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Rt st(MA) b
t(MA) s
t(MB) b
t(MB) p
t(MA) p
t(MB)
1 50 100 50 100 5.365 4.955
2 100 89 0 111 0 9.929
3 63 133 37 67 5.365 4.839
4 100 128 0 72 2.427 9.929
5 100 135 0 65 2.423 9.929
6 100 138 0 62 2.427 9.929
7 100 139 0 61 1.844 9.929
8 100 140 0 60 3.09 9.929
9 100 142 0 58 3.078 9.929
10 100 142 0 58 1.844 9.929
11 100 142 0 58 2.466 9.86
12 100 142 0 58 3.078 9.929
13 100 142 0 58 3.676 9.929
14 100 142 0 58 2.427 9.929
15 100 142 0 58 2.466 9.929
16 100 142 0 58 2.423 9.86
17 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.929
18 100 142 0 58 2.862 9.86
19 100 142 0 58 2.423 9.86
20 100 142 0 58 2.641 9.86
21 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.84
22 100 142 0 58 2.812 9.86
23 100 142 0 58 3.7 9.929
24 100 142 0 58 2.423 9.929
25 100 142 0 58 2.812 9.929
26 100 142 0 58 3.09 9.929
27 100 142 0 58 3.09 9.929
28 100 142 0 58 2.641 9.929
29 100 142 0 58 2.812 9.846
30 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.86
31 100 142 0 58 2.862 9.84
32 100 142 0 58 2.641 9.846
33 100 142 0 58 2.423 9.846
34 100 142 0 58 3.011 9.929
35 100 142 0 58 3.078 9.929
36 100 142 0 58 3.011 9.929
37 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.86
38 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.846
39 100 142 0 58 2.466 9.846
40 100 142 0 58 2.01 9.929
41 100 142 0 58 2.641 9.689
42 100 142 0 58 2.812 9.929
43 100 142 0 58 3.078 9.929
44 100 142 0 58 2.862 9.86
45 100 142 0 58 3.011 9.929
46 100 142 0 58 2.641 9.846
47 100 142 0 58 2.495 9.929
48 100 142 0 58 2.423 9.846
49 100 142 0 58 2.097 9.846
50 100 142 0 58 3.011 9.805
Table 6.17: Dynamics of the prices and the distribution of agents: one simulation run
under Setting G4.
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an extremely high listing fee.
6.3.2.2 Simulations under Treatments H, I, and J
Simulations under Treatment G study the influence of asymmetric listing fees within
a population of 100 sellers and 200 buyers, with an aggregate seller-buyer ratio of 0.5.
This subsection analyzes the simulations under Treatments H, I, and J, which examine
the influence of asymmetric listing fees under other input parameter combinations. The
objective is to see whether the observations under Treatment G still hold true.
In Treatment H, the aggregate seller-buyer ratio is still 0.5, but the initial distri-
bution of agents is different between Settings H1, H2, H3, and H4. In both H1 and
H2, MA charges a lower fee of 1.0, while MB charges a higher fee, and the fee charged
by MB in Setting H2 is even higher than in H1. Compared to that, MB charges a
relatively low fee of 1.0 in H3 and H4, but the listing fee in MA is higher in Setting H4
than in H3.
Steady states are observed in simulations under all those settings. To give an
overview of the simulation results, Figure 6.15 depicts the distributions of agents under
these four settings in the steady states. Denote the number of agents in a marketplace as
the size of a marketplace. We see from Figures 6.15a and 6.15b that if the marketplace
with a larger size charges a higher listing fee, it loses some sellers as well as some
buyers, and consequently its size is reduced in the steady state. In fact, it is even
possible that the marketplace with a larger size loses so many agents that it becomes
the marketplace with a smaller size, as shown in Figure 6.15b. In contrast, if the
smaller-sized marketplace charges a higher listing fee, it loses even more agents and
its size becomes even smaller, as one can see from Figures 6.15c and 6.15d. These
observations are consistent with those under TG.
Now the influence of the listing fees on the sellers’ side is analyzed. According to the
simulation model, sellers who participate in the same marketplace always receive the
same payoff in a simulation round. Therefore, it is easy to compare the sellers’ payoffs
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Figure 6.15: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treat-
ment H.
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between the marketplaces. For each simulation run, an average payoff of the sellers
in a marketplace during the steady state is calculated, and compared to the average
payoff in the other marketplace. Table 6.18 lists the average payoffs of the sellers in
MA and MB (denoted by pis(MA) and ̂pis(MB) respectively) in the thirty simulation
runs under Setting H1. Similarly, Table 6.19 lists the average payoffs of the sellers in
simulations under Setting H2.
In each of the two tables, one can see that the average payoffs of the sellers in the
two marketplaces are at the same level. However, the payoff levels are different between
the two tables. The payoffs in both marketplaces under H1 are roughly in the range
from 2.0 to 4.0, while under Setting H2 the payoffs are roughly in the range from 0.5
to 1.5. This is because the value of l(MB) is set higher in Setting H2 than in H1, which
drives more agents from MB to MA under Setting H2 than under H1. This results in
MA containing relatively more sellers under H2, and consequently the sellers’ payoffs in
MA are generally lower than under H1. For the marketplace MB, although the prices
in MB under Setting H2 are generally higher than under H1 due to a greater loss of
sellers, it is discounted by the higher value of l(MB). As a result, in both marketplaces,
the average payoff of sellers is lower under Setting H2 than under H1.
If MA charges a higher listing fee than MB, as simulated in H3 and H4, similar
observations are obtained in respect to the average payoff of sellers. The detailed data
that support this are listed in Table 6.20 and Table 6.21.
The simulations under Treatment I and Treatment J have also converged to multiple
steady states. Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 depict the distribution of agents in the steady
states in each of those settings. It is clear from the graphs that the observations under
those settings are all consistent with the observations in Treatment G, with respect to
the distribution of agents in the steady states. The observations with respect to the
average payoff of sellers during the steady state are also consistent among the treatment
settings among asymmetric listing fees.28
28Due to space limitation, the detail is omitted.
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Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB) Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB)
1 3.159 2.458 16 3.067 2.386
2 3.625 2.249 17 3.323 2.225
3 2.895 2.589 18 3.453 2.397
4 3.247 2.368 19 3.864 2.198
5 3.373 2.338 20 3.373 2.336
6 2.668 2.568 21 2.935 2.482
7 3.805 2.272 22 3.937 2.087
8 2.962 2.433 23 3.500 2.337
9 3.193 2.414 24 3.519 2.308
10 3.747 2.098 25 3.903 2.178
11 2.918 2.530 26 3.203 2.332
12 3.271 2.436 27 3.231 2.365
13 3.355 2.456 28 3.584 2.232
14 3.293 2.251 29 3.698 2.266
15 4.034 2.097 30 3.650 2.278
Table 6.18: Average payoff of sellers during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting H1.
Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB) Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB)
1 0.993 0.845 16 1.148 1.023
2 1.462 0.889 17 0.930 0.825
3 0.784 0.419 18 1.160 0.504
4 1.231 0.728 19 0.813 0.726
5 1.382 1.275 20 1.386 0.978
6 1.438 0.730 21 1.264 0.921
7 0.893 0.597 22 1.392 0.753
8 0.971 0.554 23 0.969 0.628
9 1.050 0.504 24 1.576 0.848
10 1.571 1.108 25 1.660 0.806
11 1.198 1.003 26 1.277 0.921
12 0.780 0.592 27 1.207 0.750
13 1.290 0.720 28 1.186 1.112
14 0.935 0.859 29 0.929 0.644
15 1.016 0.588 30 0.882 0.526
Table 6.19: Average payoff of sellers during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting H2.
6.3 Results of the Treatments with Listing Fees 121
Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB) Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB)
1 2.631 3.936 16 2.850 3.725
2 3.039 3.779 17 2.383 3.848
3 2.646 3.910 18 2.356 3.952
4 2.966 3.720 19 2.486 3.913
5 2.781 3.923 20 2.635 3.843
6 2.446 3.894 21 2.954 3.764
7 2.836 3.791 22 2.488 3.865
8 2.958 3.580 23 2.774 3.759
9 3.170 3.627 24 2.775 3.840
10 3.391 3.640 25 3.094 3.755
11 3.112 3.723 26 2.773 3.855
12 3.217 3.557 27 2.813 3.712
13 2.782 3.828 28 2.598 3.777
14 2.693 3.838 29 2.720 3.927
15 2.438 3.860 30 3.341 3.576
Table 6.20: Average payoff of sellers during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting H3.
Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB) Run pis(MA) ̂pis(MB)
1 1.984 3.487 16 2.989 3.347
2 2.633 3.200 17 1.410 3.672
3 2.798 3.304 18 2.756 3.062
4 2.961 3.574 19 3.288 3.411
5 1.477 3.778 20 1.952 3.671
6 2.589 3.349 21 2.785 3.307
7 0.974 3.805 22 2.294 3.465
8 2.735 3.072 23 2.373 3.292
9 1.712 3.391 24 2.845 3.217
10 2.328 3.433 25 2.368 3.516
11 1.453 3.566 26 2.352 3.486
12 2.890 3.392 27 2.662 3.354
13 1.912 3.570 28 2.544 3.309
14 1.883 3.493 29 1.472 3.823
15 2.970 3.409 30 2.368 3.116
Table 6.21: Average payoff of sellers during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under setting H4.
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(d) Thirty simulation runs under Setting I4
Figure 6.16: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treat-
ment I.
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(a) Thirty simulation runs under Setting J1
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(b) Thirty simulation runs under Setting J2
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(c) Thirty simulation runs under Setting J3
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(d) Thirty simulation runs under Setting J4
Figure 6.17: Distributions of agents in the steady states: simulations under Treat-
ment J.
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As a short summary of Section 6.3.2.2, simulations under Treatments H, I and,
J confirm the observations in Treatment G: the higher the listing fee charged in a
marketplace (compared to the other marketplace), the more agents the marketplace
loses. Furthermore, the analysis in this subsection shows that the average payoff of
sellers in the two marketplaces is on the same level, despite the fact that sellers are
charged different listing fees in the marketplaces.
6.4 Discussion and Summary of Results
This section is intended to give an overview of the observations obtained from the
simulations, and compares the results with those in the related literature.
In this chapter, simulations of the competition for participants between two similar
e-auction marketplaces consist of two parts of experiments. The first part simulates
two competing markets without listing fees. With respect to this part, the following
observations are made.
1. The simulated system generally converges to a steady state of a market duopoly,
in which no participant is willing to leave his current marketplace and join the
other one.
2. The simulated system in a steady state can quickly converge to a similar steady
state, despite the mutation of some agents (i.e., agents irrationally leaving their
current marketplace).
3. The difference of the winning prices between the marketplaces is generally small
during the steady state, if compared to those before the steady state is reached.
4. The steady state is not unique but rather exists across a broad range. Simulations
that start from the same initial distribution of agents may converge to steady
states with different distributions of agents. An equal split of buyers and sellers
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between the marketplaces can be observed, but steady states with quite different
numbers of buyers and sellers in the two marketplaces also exist.
5. For the simulation runs under the same setting, the distributions of agents in
the steady states share certain characteristics. Statistical analysis shows that the
seller-buyer ratios of the two marketplaces almost equal each other, and also equal
the aggregate seller-buyer ratio. Moreover, the strength of a linear relationship
between the number of sellers and the number of buyers in each marketplace is
strong.
6. The existence of the steady state is not dependent on a certain size of the popu-
lation, a certain initial distribution of agents, or a certain aggregate seller-buyer
ratio of the whole economy. The above observations hold generally, with the
exception of an extremely small population.
The above five findings are consistent with the conclusions from an analytical model
by Ellison et al. (2004). They find that two competing and otherwise identical market
platforms or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. Moreover, there
is a broad range of “quasi-equilibria”.29
With respect to small populations, they analyze a “thin” market scenario, in which
the number of sellers is extremely small. They consider an economy with many buyers
but only three sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. They point out that equilib-
rium on market duopoly exists, when S1 = 1, S2 = 2, B1 = (2B−1)/5, B2 = (3B+1)/5,
and B1 and B2 are both integers. Here S1 and B1 represent the number of sellers and
buyers in one marketplace M1, while S2 and B2 represent the corresponding numbers
in its rival marketplace M2. B is the total number of buyers in the whole economy.
Simulations within a small population in this work (i.e., Treatment A) find some
steady states that are consistent with the above proposition. For example, out of thirty
29“Quasi-equilibria” is the term created in the paper. The difference between quasi-equilibria and
the commonly used concept of equilibria is that the number of sellers and the number of buyers in a
marketplace must be integers.
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runs under Setting A1, the steady state with the distribution of s(MA) = 3, b(MA) =
7, s(MB) = 3, b(MB) = 7 is observed for three times. Out of the thirty runs under Set-
ting A2, it is also observed that the simulation converges to a distribution of s(MA) = 2,
b(MA) = 8, s(MB) = 2, b(MB) = 8 for two times. However, the distribution of agents
are rather erratic in other steady states observed. Therefore, the steady states that
are consistent with the above proposition by Ellison et al. could be only a coincidence.
From another point of view, the fact that a general analytical solution is not given in
their paper supports, to some extent, the finding in this work that a steady state in
the sense of equilibrium on market duopoly may not occur within an extremely small
population.
The second part of the simulation experiment analyzes the dynamics of the system
regarding two competing marketplaces which charge listing fees. Firstly, two market-
places that charge the same listing fee are simulated. Simulations in this case lead to
the following observations.
7. The simulated system generally converges to a steady state of market duopoly,
if both marketplaces charge the same listing fee.
8. The characteristics of the steady states in the symmetric listing fee case are the
same as that in the case without listing fees.
9. An exception to the above two findings is that when both marketplace charge
a listing fee that is unreasonably high, all sellers simply stay in their current
marketplace.
Secondly, the case that two marketplaces charge different listing fees is also simu-
lated. This part of study leads to the following observations.
10. For two marketplaces with an equal split of sellers and buyers, a steady-state
duopoly exists, in which one marketplace does not charge a listing fee, while the
other marketplace does. In the steady state, the marketplace that does not charge
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a listing fee acquires participants, including sellers as well as buyers. Despite that,
the marketplace that charges a listing fee does not lose all its participants.
11. If both marketplaces charge listing fees but of different amounts, a steady-state
duopoly can still be observed. In such a case, the higher the discrepancy between
the two listing fees, the more participants acquired by the lower-fee marketplace.
12. It is possible that a marketplace that starts initially with a smaller size and a lower
listing fee acquires so many participants from the other one that it becomes the
larger marketplace. Contrarily, if the smaller-sized marketplace charges a higher
listing fee, it loses many participants and its size becomes even smaller.
13. The characteristics of the steady states in the simulations without listing fees,
are not observed in the steady states that are converged to in simulations with
listing fees.
14. Sellers receive similar payoffs, independent of which marketplace they participate
in.
15. A monopoly state occurs if the discrepancy between the amounts of the listing
fees is very high.
16. The above findings with respect to the asymmetric listing fee case are not de-
pendent on a certain population size, a certain initial distribution of agents, or a
certain aggregate seller-buyer ratio of the economy.
To the author’s knowledge, the influence of listing fees on competing marketplaces
has only been studied by Ellison et al. (2004). They show that equilibrium of monopoly
may exist, in which only one marketplace charges a listing fee. They also show that
equilibrium on market duopoly may exist when both marketplaces charge the same
listing fee. These conclusions are consistent with the findings in the presented work,
as listed in the above.
6.4 Discussion and Summary of Results 128
However, the above mentioned authors do not deal with asymmetric listing fees.
To the author’s knowledge, the presented work is the only one that studies asymmetric
listing fees in competing marketplaces.
Based on the above findings, the next chapter discusses how these findings con-
tribute to the existing theories, and what are the implications of these findings on the
strategic operation of marketplace operators. The limitations of the study will also be
discussed, as well as the possible extensions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Outlook
A market has endogenous characteristics of potential competition and dynamics. When
an economy consists of more than one marketplace, the competition and dynamics
may exist not only within a marketplace, but also between the marketplaces. Real-
world examples of such competition can be observed in conventional markets, such as
between Christie’s and Sotheby’s, as well as in online markets, such as between eBay
and Taobao.30
The presented study introduces a simulation model of competing auction market-
places. In the model, buyers and sellers are modeled as agents, who select marketplaces
to maximize their own payoffs. Simulation experiments are designed, to investigate the
dynamics of the market evolvement and the possible steady-state features. The analysis
is more on the macro level, rather than on some single agent’s behavior. The analysis
focuses on the market structure in the steady state, that is, whether the steady state
presents a market duopoly or monopoly. Moreover, the presented work is also inter-
ested in studying how the variation of the listing fee influences such evolvement and
the steady-state features.
30The competition between eBay and Taobao is briefly introduced in Section 1.2.
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7.1 Summary of the Main Contributions
Many simulations under heterogeneous settings are conducted in this work and the
analysis of the simulation data has led to many findings. A direct summary of these
findings has been given in Section 6.4. This section summarizes the findings from a
more comprehensive perspective and points out the main contributions of the presented
study.
1. Verification of existing theory
One of the main results of this study is that two competing marketplaces with
the same institution may coexist as a steady state. This result directly supports the
analytical work by Ellison et al. (2004), which concludes that auction sites of quite
different sizes can coexist in equilibria.
Another important finding of this study is the existence of market duopoly in a
competition which includes listing fees. The marketplace that charges a lower listing fee
can attract both some sellers and some buyers from the other marketplace with a higher
listing fee; however, both marketplaces survive in the competition. Such movements
from the high-fee market toward the low-fee market, which happen to both sellers and
buyers, can also be seen in a recent simulation experiment by Cai et al. (2008). They
show that the movements are sharpened by starting charging fees, because this tends
to reduce profits and further discourages agents from remaining in markets that are
unprofitable for them.
2. Provision of system dynamics
Most related literatures on the competition between markets use game-theoretic
methods and investigate the existence of equilibrium on some aspects they are inter-
ested in. Typically, a two-stage game theoretic model is built. In the first stage, traders
select a marketplace to trade, according to their information about the marketplace
and its institutional structure. In the second stage, transactions take place and it is
analyzed whether certain equilibrium exists in this stage.
Compared to the analytical solutions, the presented work uses a computer-based
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approach. The simulations conducted not only reveal the existence of steady states, but
also show how the simulation system converges to the steady states. The simulation
method also permits sensitivity analysis by manipulation of the input variables. This
advantage on one hand makes it easy to find the appropriate values of some of the
input parameters, and on the other hand facilitates the confirmation of the generality
of the observations.
3. Understanding the impact of the listing fee
Almost every e-auction marketplace has its own policy about how the sellers are
charged listing fees. However, this institution is seldom investigated. The presented
work studies this issue and shows that sellers tend to move towards the marketplace
with a relatively low listing fee for better payoffs. More interestingly, simulations also
show that some buyers, whose payoffs are not directly determined by the listing fees,
also move towards the low-fee marketplace. Moreover, if the discrepancy between
the listing fees charged in the two marketplaces is large enough, it is possible for the
marketplace of a smaller size to attract enough sellers and buyers and consequently
become the larger-sized marketplace.
4. Contributions for strategic operations
The findings regarding the impact of listing fees lead to some suggestions for the
marketplace operators in a competitive market environment. Since listing fees can
influence traders’ decisions on selecting a marketplace, the marketplace operators can
use this institution as a tool to attract participants. There are two advantages. One is
that a listing fee is public information for all current participants as well as potential
participants. The other advantage is that a marketplace needs not to make efforts in
attracting both sellers and buyers at the same time. Rather, a marketplace can first
attract many sellers by setting a more favorable listing fee than it is charged by its
rival. Then, the increased number of sellers may help the marketplace in attracting
more buyers from its rival. This strategy is especially important for a marketplace
which has a relatively small share of participants.
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The impact of listing fees also pushes the e-marketplace operators to realize that
they should always be aware of the influence of the institutional change on the market
structure, and be creative in finding a set of institutions that generates a positive
influence on their market shares.
7.2 Limitations of the Study
This section discusses the limitations of the study. The disadvantages of the simulation
approach itself are addressed first, and then several limitations in the presented study
are discussed.
General disadvantages of using the simulation approach
Despite simulations often producing valuable results, there are also some limita-
tions of the approach. Generally, there are four disadvantages to using the simulation
approach in problem solving, as listed in the following (Adkins and Pooch, 1977).
1. A simulation model may become expensive in terms of manpower and computer
time.
2. Extensive development time may be encountered.
3. Hidden critical assumptions may cause the model to diverge from reality.
4. Model parameters may be difficult to initialize. These may require extensive time
in collection, analysis, and interpretation.
With the development of computer technologies, conducting simulations has become
less expensive. However, the other three disadvantages still exist. Although simulation
might be the easiest tool for management science to use, as pointed out by Phillips
et al. (1976), it is also probably one of the hardest to apply properly and perhaps the
most difficult to draw accurate conclusions. They further state that the skills required
to develop and operate an effective simulation models are substantial. The variability
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or dispersion of simulation results is a significant problem in itself and may require
long and complex simulation analysis in order to draw meaningful conclusions from
the simulation.
Limitations in the presented study
Although the simulation results of the presented work meet well with the relevant
theoretical results, the simulation model used is rather simple and may not reflect the
reality in the best way. In the extension of this simulation model, it has some particular
limitations.
This model is particularly limited to the competition between two marketplaces.
To extend the model to describe the scenario of three or more competing marketplaces,
part of the model needs to be modified, for example in the decision-making part. This
is not a trivial issue, because if an agent does not prefer the current marketplace,
additional modeling is then necessary, regarding how to determine which of the other
marketplaces is most preferred.
It would be a valuable effort if a laboratory experiment or an empirical study is
conducted to study the real behavior of human participants on selecting marketplaces,
and compare the findings with the results from the simulation experiment. This may
give evidence whether the conclusions from this presented work hold true in reality.
Moreover, a laboratory experiment or an empirical study may investigate factors that
are difficult to be captured by simulations, such as the risk attitude in switching to
another marketplace, the habit of multi-homing, etc.
However, it can be difficult to obtain the real data. First, a huge amount of data
regarding participants’ decisions in a continuous time space is necessary for analysis.
Second, the decisions of the participants can be comprehensive ones that combine so
many factors that are too complex for analysis. Moreover, real-world business operators
might be reluctant to reveal private data of their individual participants.31
31Especially, it is necessary to obtain data from not only one marketplace operator, but at least two
operators who are rivals to each other. This makes the collection of data more difficult.
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7.3 Outlook
This work studies the competition between two e-auction marketplaces, in which the
marketplaces compete to attract sellers and buyers. Computer-based simulation is used
as the main methodology. The results of the conduced simulations are promising for
further research. In the following, some ideas for future research are presented.
Firstly, it is possible to improve and to extend the simulation model. Although
in Section 7.2 some limitations of the model have been pointed out, the model is still
advantageous for many extensions, which demand only trivial modification of the model
in addition.
For example, the decision-making process can be easily extended to include other
monetary factors. This is because preference is always based on payoff calculations.
Monetary factors, such as transaction cost and reserve price, can be conveniently in-
corporated into the payoff calculation function in the same way that the listing fee is
incorporated.
Another possible modification of the model is to consider the competition not under
a static population but a dynamic one. This modification enables us to study the
impact of a dynamic population (for example, an increasing population) on the market
structure in the steady state. The motivation of this extension is that more and
more people have started to trade on the Internet in recent years, which has led to
a significant increase of the population in the whole e-auction economy.
Secondly, it is also interesting to introduce more complex methods in modeling the
agents. The approaches from Computational Economics can be considered, such as
genetic algorithms. As it is widely used in artificial intelligence, it may also be applied
in the learning process of agents in finding the best strategy for payoff maximization.
Last but not least, the application field, which is confined to the electronic auction
market in the presented study, can also be extended to other fields, such as the stock
exchange markets, the energy trading markets, etc. The marketplace operators in those
electronic markets are generally facing the problem of attracting potential participants,
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because most of the marketplaces base their business models (where the main profit
comes from) on the scale of customers (the amount of participants). Simulation under
the framework of this study can help the operators achieve a better understanding of
the market dynamics and may also support them in strategic operations.
There are certainly many more open questions in the understanding of markets
and competition. The author hopes that this study contributes to the existing work
and the simulation approach is accepted as a promising approach for similar research
problems.

Appendix A
Mathematical Proof
Consider a uniform-price sealed-bid auction. There are x sellers and y buyers, who
participate in the auction. y > x ≥ 1. Each seller has one unit to offer and each buyer
has single-unit demand. The winning price is determined by the highest rejected bid.
Suppose that the winning price is p. Denote the valuation of a buyer i by vi and
his bid by bi. His payoff in this auction is:
pii =
 vi − p , if bi > p0 , otherwise
Proposition A.1. In a uniform-price sealed-bid auction with multiple single-unit-offer
sellers and single-unit-demand buyers, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer
to bid his valuation.
Proof. Suppose that the bid bi by buyer i does not equal his valuation vi. First consider
the case that bi > p. In this case the buyer wins the auction. If, in this case, vi > p,
then the buyer receives a positive payoff of vi − p, no matter whether bi > vi > p or
vi > bi > p. If, otherwise, vi ≤ p, then the buyer’s payoff vi − p is a negative value.
But if he has bid his true valuation, he would have made a better payoff, although it
will be only zero.
Then, we consider the case that bi ≤ p. In this case the buyer loses the auction,
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Case if vi > p if vi ≤ p
if bi = vi pi = vi − p > 0 pi = 0
if bi > p pi = vi − p > 0 pi = vi − p < 0if bi 6= vi if bi ≤ p pi = 0 pi = 0
Table A.1: Payoff of a buyer.
and his payoff is zero anyway. However, if vi > p, then the buyer might have won the
auction by bidding true valuation and received a positive payoff of vi−p. This happens
when vi is higher than the current lowest accepted bid, otherwise the buyer still loses
and receives a payoff of zero. If, otherwise, that is, vi ≤ p, then the buyer loses and his
payoff is always zero, no matter p > vi > bi or p > bi > vi.
To make it more clear, Table A.1 shows the payoff of a buyer i in all cases. From the
table, one can see that a buyer is not better off, if his bid does not equal his valuation.
Therefore, bidding the true valuation is a weakly dominant strategy.
Appendix B
Simulation Data and Measurements
This appendix shows the average price difference between the two marketplaces, MA
and MB, during the steady states. Each of the following tables lists the average price
differences in thirty simulation runs under one simulation setting.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.599 11 0.466 21 0.529
2 0.446 12 0.779 22 0.437
3 0.470 13 0.588 23 0.414
4 0.531 14 0.357 24 0.359
5 0.571 15 0.726 25 0.607
6 0.395 16 0.474 26 0.408
7 0.365 17 0.524 27 0.545
8 0.753 18 0.581 28 0.521
9 0.974 19 0.585 29 0.574
10 0.630 20 0.417 30 0.490
Table B.1: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting B2.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.460 11 0.408 21 0.423
2 0.476 12 0.450 22 0.376
3 0.474 13 0.547 23 0.482
4 0.553 14 0.372 24 0.468
5 0.726 15 0.584 25 0.396
6 0.577 16 0.538 26 0.667
7 0.387 17 0.496 27 0.491
8 0.531 18 0.488 28 0.466
9 0.398 19 0.467 29 0.497
10 0.528 20 0.401 30 0.466
Table B.2: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting B3.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.460 11 0.408 21 0.423
2 0.476 12 0.450 22 0.376
3 0.474 13 0.547 23 0.482
4 0.553 14 0.372 24 0.468
5 0.726 15 0.584 25 0.396
6 0.577 16 0.538 26 0.667
7 0.387 17 0.496 27 0.491
8 0.531 18 0.488 28 0.466
9 0.398 19 0.467 29 0.497
10 0.528 20 0.401 30 0.466
Table B.3: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting B4.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.766 11 0.524 21 0.615
2 0.567 12 0.508 22 0.680
3 0.496 13 0.730 23 0.698
4 0.559 14 0.525 24 0.681
5 0.441 15 0.561 25 0.659
6 0.477 16 0.491 26 0.490
7 0.558 17 0.543 27 0.401
8 0.552 18 0.469 28 0.623
9 0.466 19 0.485 29 0.620
10 0.535 20 0.568 30 0.572
Table B.4: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting C1.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.655 11 0.577 21 0.385
2 0.466 12 0.461 22 0.456
3 0.598 13 0.519 23 0.596
4 0.413 14 0.461 24 0.600
5 0.407 15 0.632 25 0.404
6 0.474 16 0.447 26 0.366
7 0.410 17 0.545 27 0.396
8 0.668 18 0.413 28 0.525
9 0.634 19 0.520 29 0.449
10 0.579 20 0.519 30 0.291
Table B.5: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting C2.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.467 11 0.449 21 0.491
2 0.486 12 0.475 22 0.485
3 0.485 13 0.581 23 0.591
4 0.480 14 0.558 24 0.622
5 0.334 15 0.564 25 0.425
6 0.541 16 0.457 26 0.485
7 0.506 17 0.587 27 0.355
8 0.473 18 0.564 28 0.555
9 0.482 19 0.433 29 0.437
10 0.436 20 0.630 30 0.407
Table B.6: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting C3.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.516 11 0.536 21 0.329
2 0.425 12 0.858 22 0.476
3 0.482 13 0.449 23 0.488
4 0.584 14 0.470 24 0.573
5 0.521 15 0.363 25 0.577
6 0.434 16 0.479 26 0.725
7 0.760 17 0.641 27 0.514
8 0.845 18 0.358 28 0.440
9 0.494 19 0.545 29 0.466
10 0.522 20 0.298 30 0.489
Table B.7: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting C4.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.305 11 0.159 21 0.434
2 0.193 12 0.388 22 0.258
3 0.379 13 0.194 23 0.262
4 0.432 14 0.367 24 0.213
5 0.507 15 0.116 25 0.312
6 0.139 16 0.339 26 0.327
7 0.138 17 0.136 27 0.484
8 0.262 18 0.476 28 0.266
9 0.263 19 0.386 29 0.185
10 0.172 20 0.198 30 0.543
Table B.8: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting D1.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.210 11 0.282 21 0.372
2 0.187 12 0.343 22 0.161
3 0.127 13 0.214 23 0.212
4 0.432 14 0.467 24 0.241
5 0.167 15 0.124 25 0.126
6 0.271 16 0.296 26 0.400
7 0.166 17 0.168 27 0.337
8 0.259 18 0.271 28 0.279
9 0.253 19 0.232 29 0.210
10 0.246 20 0.171 30 0.192
Table B.9: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting D2.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.162 11 0.121 21 0.138
2 0.139 12 0.133 22 0.116
3 0.129 13 0.130 23 0.097
4 0.108 14 0.149 24 0.108
5 0.098 15 0.089 25 0.130
6 0.111 16 0.129 26 0.238
7 0.130 17 0.112 27 0.095
8 0.104 18 0.078 28 0.137
9 0.247 19 0.090 29 0.156
10 0.151 20 0.140 30 0.124
Table B.10: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting D3.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.131 11 0.107 21 0.207
2 0.102 12 0.105 22 0.095
3 0.109 13 0.084 23 0.100
4 0.183 14 0.076 24 0.112
5 0.101 15 0.113 25 0.081
6 0.106 16 0.074 26 0.136
7 0.130 17 0.104 27 0.078
8 0.139 18 0.130 28 0.116
9 0.100 19 0.084 29 0.102
10 0.105 20 0.090 30 0.102
Table B.11: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting D4.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.132 11 0.172 21 0.202
2 0.243 12 0.187 22 0.291
3 0.199 13 0.191 23 0.262
4 0.206 14 0.174 24 0.250
5 0.254 15 0.323 25 0.136
6 0.196 16 0.408 26 0.165
7 0.166 17 0.205 27 0.170
8 0.277 18 0.150 28 0.293
9 0.227 19 0.132 29 0.300
10 0.180 20 0.239 30 0.152
Table B.12: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting E1.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.133 11 0.186 21 0.156
2 0.175 12 0.219 22 0.185
3 0.184 13 0.178 23 0.177
4 0.139 14 0.122 24 0.151
5 0.130 15 0.186 25 0.231
6 0.140 16 0.123 26 0.284
7 0.133 17 0.174 27 0.132
8 0.141 18 0.207 28 0.131
9 0.237 19 0.103 29 0.161
10 0.206 20 0.119 30 0.194
Table B.13: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting E2.
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Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.256 11 0.140 21 0.219
2 0.138 12 0.261 22 0.152
3 0.182 13 0.127 23 0.190
4 0.239 14 0.156 24 0.142
5 0.199 15 0.136 25 0.135
6 0.147 16 0.140 26 0.138
7 0.216 17 0.188 27 0.200
8 0.152 18 0.150 28 0.148
9 0.155 19 0.201 29 0.152
10 0.145 20 0.108 30 0.170
Table B.14: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting E3.
Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p Run ∆˜p
1 0.319 11 0.132 21 0.182
2 0.170 12 0.200 22 0.147
3 0.164 13 0.205 23 0.176
4 0.219 14 0.280 24 0.157
5 0.283 15 0.154 25 0.216
6 0.147 16 0.134 26 0.253
7 0.146 17 0.140 27 0.221
8 0.152 18 0.159 28 0.230
9 0.244 19 0.199 29 0.141
10 0.140 20 0.143 30 0.080
Table B.15: Average price difference during the steady state: thirty simulation runs
under Setting E4.
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